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I. INTRODUCTION
The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (“CDA”) governs disputes “re-
lating to a contract” between federal executive agencies and contrac-
tors.1 It establishes the process for parties to seek administrative
remedies for claims under covered contracts.2 It also limits the right to
judicial review of agency decisions to specific “boards of contract ap-
peals” (“BCA”) and the United States Court of Federal Claims
(“COFC”). According to the CDA’s sponsors, Congress enacted the
law to bring reliability and order to a hodge-podge of conflicting and
inconsistent rules for adjudicating contract disputes used by the vari-
ous executive agencies. The law aimed to simplify the process for
resolving agency-contractor disputes in light of the growing complexi-
ties and importance of Government procurement programs.3 In intro-
ducing the bill, its primary sponsor underscored the need for an
efficient adjudicatory process in which both Government agencies and
the contracting industries had confidence:
One cannot dispute the almost universal expressions of industry and
the practicing bar that the system needs change. A good remedies
system is a major element in good procurement, and a good system
depends not only on fairness and justice, but also on whether the
people who are subject to the system believe it is fair and just.4
In some respects, the CDA fell short of providing a comprehensive
framework for Government contract dispute resolution and its stated
aim to “provide to the fullest extent practicable, informal, expeditious,
1. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2012)).
2. See id. The CDA is a procedural law. It does not create any substantive rights
or causes of action. The types of claims and defenses that may arise under any subject
“contract” are as numerous and variegated as the contracts themselves, their subject
matter, applicable Federal Acquisition Regulations, 48 C.F.R. 1 et seq. (“FAR”), and
federal “common law.” The FAR, the comprehensive set of regulations generally cov-
ering federal acquisition, was first promulgated in 1984 to create “uniform policies
and procedures” for procurement hitherto covered by disparate agency regulations.
This Article considers only a few of the more frequent or typical types of disputes
litigated under the CDA in illustrating significant statute of limitations issues. See
infra Part IV. For comprehensive treatises covering contract disputes under the CDA,
see, for example, GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
298-326 (4th ed. 2006); KAREN L. MANOS, GOVERNMENT CONTRACT COSTS AND
PRICING (2d ed. 2011).
3. See S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 4 (1978).
4. Contract Disputes Act of 1978: Joint Hearings on S. 2292, S. 2787, and S. 3178
Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Practices & Open Gov’t of the Comm. on
Governmental Affairs & the Subcomm. on Citizens & S’holders Rights & Remedies of
the Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 2 (1978) (statement of Sen. Lawton Chiles,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Fed. Spending Practices & Open Gov’t).
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and inexpensive resolution of disputes.”5 In particular, the Act did not
prescribe any period of time for a party to submit an administrative
claim for monetary or other relief after occurrence of the breach or
other injury. After sixteen years and many complaints from both Gov-
ernment agencies and contractors about dealing with stale claims,
Congress finally adopted a CDA limitations period as part of the Fed-
eral Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”). That statute of
limitations, now codified at 41 U.S.C. §7103(a) (4), provides:
Each claim by a contractor against the Federal Government relating
to a contract and each claim by the Federal Government against a
contractor relating to a contract shall be submitted within 6 years
after the accrual of the claim.
Decisions by BCAs and Federal Circuit courts under the CDA statute
of limitations were relatively rare in the several years following the
amendment. Since the early 2010s, however, the number of cases has
skyrocketed. This spike in limitations disputes undoubtedly is attribu-
table to the massive increase in military procurement following Sep-
tember 11, including unprecedented spending for goods and services
in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other conflict zones. The sheer volume of
defense contracts and contractual activity often made it difficult for
the parties to recognize and submit claims within six years of the oc-
currence of the underlying facts. In a relatively short period of time,
the tribunals with jurisdiction over defense contract litigation had to
decide a large number of limitations disputes with little guidance from
direct precedent or legislative or regulatory history. These circum-
stances have led to case law that is not always consistent in analysis or
reconcilable in outcome.
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the architecture and
key features of the CDA.  Part II examines the salient legislative and
regulatory history surrounding the adoption of the CDA statute of
limitations. Part III discusses when a CDA claim “accrues” and trig-
gers the six-year time period for submitting a claim. In Part IV, we
review some of the major issues that arise under the statute in signifi-
cant and recurrent types of contractor-agency disputes. Part V con-
cludes with a brief evaluation of whether the CDA statute measures
up to the “long tradition of judicial authority to formulate rules ensur-
ing fair and predictable enforcement of statutes of limitations.”6
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT
A. Disputes Governed by the CDA
The CDA applies to disputes between executive agencies and con-
tractors arising under or relating to “express or implied” Government
5. See Contract Disputes Act of 1978 § 8(e).
6. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 761 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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contracts for the procurement of property, services, construction, re-
pair, and maintenance of real property, and the disposal of personal
property.7 The statute expressly excludes from its ambit disputes relat-
ing to contracts concerning the procurement of real property in be-
ing.8 The dispute, moreover, must relate to an existing contract
between the parties. The CDA does not apply, for example, to pro-
tests by disappointed contract bidders.9 The statute also carves out
from its coverage any claims for “fraud.”
B. The Forums for Judicial Review
The CDA establishes the administrative boards of contract appeals
and the Court of Federal Claims, an Article I court, for appeals by
contractors from Government agency “contracting officer” final deci-
sions, which may deny a contractor’s claim against the Government
agency or assert a Government claim against the contractor.10 The
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”) has jurisdic-
tion over appeals from final decisions of all Department of Defense
(“DoD”) components and the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration (“NASA”). The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, part
of the General Services Administration, has jurisdiction over appeals
from all executive agency final decisions other than the DoD, the Post
Office, and the Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), the latter two of
which also have their own appeals boards.
To obtain administrative judicial review, a contactor must file an
appeal within ninety days of its receipt of an agency’s final decision
(except in the case of the TVA, which is twelve months).11 Alterna-
tively, a contractor may appeal to the COFC within twelve months of
the final decision.  Timely filing of an appeal from a final decision is
“jurisdictional.” That is, the BCAs and the COFC must dismiss any
untimely appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.12
BCA and COFC review of agency final decisions entails “de novo”
adjudication of facts and determinations of law.13 The reviewing panel
7. 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a) (2012).
8. § 7102(a) (1).
9. Statistica, Inc., ASBCA No. 44116, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,095.
10. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7104–7105.
11. § 7104.
12. See, e.g., Precision Metals Corp., ASBCA No. 61422, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,035, at
180,314–15 (“We conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. It is familiar that,
under the Contract Disputes Act (Act), a contracting officer’s final decision ‘is not
subject to review by any . . . tribunal . . . unless an appeal . . . is timely commenced.’ 41
U.S.C. § 7103(g). In turn, the Act defines timely commencement to be bringing an
appeal to the Board ‘within 90 days from the date of receipt of a contracting officer’s
decision.’ 41 U.S.C. § 7104(a). Numerous decisions give effect to this time limitation,
treating it as jurisdictional.”).
13. § 7104(b) (1), (3), (4). The United States Claims Court was renamed the
United States Court of Federal Claims on October 29, 1992. Federal Courts Adminis-
tration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516.
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“is constrained neither by the findings and determination of the con-
tracting officer nor by the issues framed in the pleadings.”14 Although
the CDA expressly refers only to COFC proceedings as “de novo,”
Congress did not intend for there to be any differences in the review
function between agency boards and the COFC. On the contrary:
One primary purpose of the CDA . . . is to achieve parity between
the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Federal Claims and
the boards. The CDA has as one of its purposes the elimination of
differences in the jurisdictions of the forums which decide Govern-
ment contract disputes. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 12 (1978) (“The considerable disharmony between the admin-
istrative and judicial systems that oversee the resolution of disputes
was a matter of considerable concern to the Procurement Commis-
sion. . . . [The CDA provides a] pragmatic answer.”). Thus, the CDA
provides for appeals from a CO’s decision alternatively to either the
Board or directly to the Court of Federal Claims.15
Under the CDA, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“Federal Circuit”) has jurisdiction over appeals from dispositive deci-
sions by the BCAs and the COFC.16 Federal Circuit decisions in CDA
cases are binding precedent in the COFC and the BCAs. The COFC
and the BCAs are not bound by the decisions of the other.17
C. The Administrative Requisites to Judicial Review
Under the CDA, a party’s assertion of a written “claim” that in-
cludes certain formal elements, and an agency contracting officer’s “fi-
nal decision,” are both necessary to establish subject matter
jurisdiction for an appeal to a BCA or the COFC.18  In a “final deci-
14. Space Age Eng’g, Inc., ASBCA No. 26028, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,766.
15. Garrett v. General Elec. Co., 987 F.2d 747, 749–50 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Thus,
“[w]here the contractor chooses to appeal to a contract appeals board, the statute
declares that in exercising its jurisdiction ‘the agency board is authorized to grant any
relief that would be available to a litigant asserting a contract claim in the United
States Claims Court’ (41 U.S.C. § 607(d))—thus placing the board’s authority on a
par with that of the Claims Court.”
16. 41 U.S.C. § 7107(a) (1) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (3), (10) (2012) (vesting the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with jurisdiction over appeals from final
decisions of the COFC and BCAs).
17. See, e.g., Premiere Bldg. Servs., Inc., ASBCA No. 51804, 00-1 BCA ¶ 30,696,
at 151,639 (“decisions of the COFC are not controlling precedent for this Board”);
Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 210, 219 n.21 (2013) (“Although
decisions of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (‘ASBCA’) ‘are not ac-
corded stare decisis effect, the court may find the reasoning contained therein persua-
sive.’” (quoting W. Bay Builders, Inc. v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 1, 29 n.29 (2008))).
18. L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P., ASBCA Nos. 60713, 60716, 17-1 BCA ¶
36,865, at 179,623 (“CDA jurisdiction requires both a valid claim and a contracting
officer’s final decision on that claim” (citing M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United
States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010))); Accord, J.P. Donovan Constr., Inc. v.
Mabus, 469 Fed. Appx. 903, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“The ‘jurisdictional prerequisites to
any appeal’ under the CDA are that ‘the contractor must submit a proper claim . . .
[and] . . . the contractor must have received the contracting officer’s final decision on
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sion,” the agency contracting officer asserts a Government claim, or
approves or denies a contractor’s claim. Under the CDA’s structure,
the Government agency through the “final decision” controls the dis-
position of all “claims.” Contracting officer “final decisions” are bind-
ing on the contractor unless it files an appeal. Thus, only contractors
file appeals from final decisions.19
The CDA administrative “claim” is at the core of the CDA.  A
“claim” asserted by the contractor or the Government agency against
the other party to the contract, often referred to as “presentment,”
initiates the disputes process.20 Importantly, “claim” in this context
includes, but is not synonymous with, “cause of action.”  Rather, the
CDA “claim” is a written assertion of a cause of action that must con-
form to several formal elements. The consequences of failing to con-
form to these “presentment” requirements may doom the opportunity
to pursue an otherwise meritorious cause of action. In general, the
BCAs and the COFC are deemed to lack “jurisdiction” over a non-
conforming “claim,” regardless of whether the “written assertion” ad-
equately pleads a cause of action for which relief otherwise could be
granted.  Of equal significance for present purposes, a non-con-
forming claim, even if submitted within the six-year period after “ac-
crual,” does not stop the running of the statute of limitations.21
that claim.’” (quoting Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1328)); Maropakis, 609 F.3d at 1327,
1329 (“[a]ll claims by a contractor against the government . . . shall be in writing” and
“shall be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision” (quoting 41 U.S.C. § 605
(2006) (recodified at 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (2012)))) (noting that each claim must also
“indicate to the contracting officer that the contractor is requesting a final decision”
(citing James M. Ellett Constr. Co.  v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1543 (Fed. Cir.
1996))).
19. A final decision asserting a government claim for money creates a valid debt
due to and collectible by the government within 30 days from its issuance. That debt
remains collectible, including in some circumstances by offset of receivables due the
contractor under other contracts, notwithstanding a contractor’s timely appeal.
20. In general, the “Disputes and Appeals” section of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations contains the regulations that implement the CDA. FAR 33.2 (2010).  The
“Initiation of a claim” section states that:
(a) Contractor claims shall be submitted, in writing, to the contracting of-
ficer for a decision within 6 years after accrual of a claim, unless the con-
tracting parties agreed to a shorter time period. This 6-year time period does
not apply to contracts awarded prior to October 1, 1995. The contracting
officer shall document the contract file with evidence of the date of receipt
of any submission from the contractor deemed to be a claim by the con-
tracting officer.
(b) The contracting officer shall issue a written decision on any Government
claim initiated against a contractor within 6 years after accrual of the claim,
unless the contracting parties agreed to a shorter time period. The 6-year
period shall not apply to contracts awarded prior to October 1, 1995, or to a
Government claim based on a contractor claim involving fraud.
FAR 33.206.
21. See, e.g., TMS Envirocon, Inc., ASBCA No. 57286, 12-2 BCA ¶ 35,084, at
172,296 (invalid contractor claim); Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 57490, 12-1 BCA ¶
34,916, at 171,673 (invalid government claim).
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Despite its centrality to the CDA process, “claim” has never been
defined in the statute. The CDA requires that a “claim” is in writing
and, in the case of a contractor, is submitted to a contracting officer
“for a decision.”22 The statute further provides that contractor claims
in excess of $100,000 must contain an authorized certification that the
claim is made in good faith and that supporting data is accurate and
complete. Beyond that, however, the CDA does not spell out what a
“claim” may or must assert and how it should assert the cause. With-
out any statutory definition, the judiciary, as if by default, applies the
definition of claim in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (“FAR”).23
The FAR definition, adopted in substantially its present form in 1984,
augments the specifications for a cognizable formal “claim” beyond
CDA requirements. The FAR definition states:
“Claim” means a written demand or written assertion by one of the
contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of
money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract
terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the contract. How-
ever, a written demand or written assertion by the contractor seek-
ing the payment of money exceeding $100,000 is not a claim under
[the Contract Disputes Act], until certified as required by the stat-
ute. A voucher, invoice, or other routine request for payment that is
not in dispute when submitted is not a claim. The submission may
be converted to a claim, by written notice to the contracting officer
as provided in 33.206(a), if it is disputed either as to liability or
amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable time.24
As a general rule, the jurisdictional validity of a “claim” present-
ment and whether it stops the running of the limitations period, de-
pends on its satisfaction of the requirements of a “claim” in the CDA
and the FAR definition.25 If a “claim” does not satisfy these require-
ments, a contracting officer is deemed to lack “authority” to issue an
22. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a) (1) (3) (2012).
23. “The CDA does not explicitly list comprehensive requirements for a ‘claim’ in
all situations . . . . Therefore, a contested claim’s sufficiency may properly be evalu-
ated against regulations implementing the CDA, the language of the contract in dis-
pute, and the facts of the case.” Dawco Constr., Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872,
877 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (adopting FAR definition of “claim”). See also Gen. Elec. Co. &
Bayport Constr. Corp., ASBCA Nos. 36005, 38152, & 39696, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,958, at
119,943 (“The CDA does not define the term ‘claim.’ The filling of this gap has been
left to rules issued by the agencies charged with administering the Act”).
24. FAR 2.101 (2017). The FAR differs from the CDA in additionally requiring
that the claim “seek, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the
adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to
the contract.” Id. (emphasis added).
25. See id.; § 7103(a) (1)–(3). Part 52 of the FAR sets forth “Solicitation Provi-
sions and Contract Clauses” that are incorporated into contracts in accordance with
and as specified by other provisions of the FAR. Most government contracts include
the “disputes” clause in FAR 52.233-1, which, among other things, provides that all
disputes arising under or relating to the contract be resolved under the CDA. FAR
33.215 (2004). The “disputes” clause includes the definition of “claim” in FAR 2.101.
FAR 52.233-1(c) (2014).
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appealable final decision on the “claim.” An administrative board or
the COFC must dismiss an appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion taken from a putative “final decision” on a claim that does not
meet the requirements of a “proper” CDA “claim.”26
Beyond the express requirements of the CDA and the FAR defini-
tion, the case law has embroidered additional features for a valid
“claim.” In general, the tribunals have applied the FAR definitional
requirement that a written demand for monetary relief must assert “as
a matter of right” a “sum certain” amount. A written demand for an
amount that expressly, or in context, can be construed as an “offer” to
settle a dispute or as a step in negotiation is not a “claim.” Similarly, a
putative monetary claim that asserts a non-specific amount, such as a
demand for “an amount to be determined at a hearing,” or that is
couched as an “estimate,” or that even specifies an amount but adds
“at a minimum,” “no less than,” or similar qualification, will not meet
the “sum certain” requirement and will be deemed invalid. The case
law, moreover, has added the gloss that, to qualify as a “claim,” the
written demand must expressly, or at least by evident implication, re-
quest a “final decision” from the contracting officer. In addition, a
“claim” that omits a “certification”27 that substantially complies with
26. If the “claim” does not comply with the FAR 2.101 definition, it is irrelevant
that the contracting officer treated it as a “claim” in issuing final decision. See
Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); Paragon
Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 971 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Hejran Hejrat Co.,
ASBCA No. 61234, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,039, at 180,323 (“A contracting officer’s character-
ization of a submission by a contractor cannot establish that a CDA claim has been
submitted.”).
27. FAR 33.207, respecting “certification,” provides:
(a) Contractors shall provide the certification specified in paragraph (c) of
this section when submitting any claim exceeding $100,000.
(b) The certification requirement does not apply to issues in controversy
that have not been submitted as all or part of a claim.
(c) The certification shall state as follows:
I certify that the claim is made in good faith; that the supporting data are
accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief; that the
amount requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the
contractor believes the Government is liable; and that I am duly authorized
to certify the claim on behalf of the contractor.
(d) The aggregate amount of both increased and decreased costs shall be
used in determining when the dollar thresholds requiring certification are
met (see example in 15.403-4(a) (1) (iii) regarding certified cost or pricing
data).
(e) The certification may be executed by any person authorized to bind the
contractor with respect to the claim.
(f) A defective certification shall not deprive a court or an agency BCA of
jurisdiction over that claim. Prior to the entry of a final judgment by a court
or a decision by an agency BCA, however, the court or agency BCA shall
require a defective certification to be corrected.
(g) The certification may be executed by any person authorized to bind the
contractor with respect to the claim.
(h) A defective certification shall not deprive a court or an agency BCA of
jurisdiction over that claim.
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the statutory requirements, signed by an agent who may bind the con-
tractor with respect to the claim, is not a valid “claim.”28
In view of the nuances of a CDA claim, more than a few claimants
have lost their “day in court” to litigate an otherwise meritorious
claim by failing to include all the elements necessary to claim “valid-
ity.” The same subtleties create risks for tolling the CDA statute of
limitations.29 A litigant who timely submits what he or she believes to
be a valid “claim” may be told by the COFC or a BCA, months or
years after appeal is taken from a contracting officer’s final decision,
that the “claim” is not valid and that the tribunal lacks jurisdiction to
consider the “claim”. If that occurs more than six years after the
“claim” accrued, then the “claim” is likely lost forever.30
III. 1995 ENACTMENT OF CDA STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
A. Rejection of Efforts to Impute a Statute of Limitations
for Administrative Claims
As noted, the CDA originally did not prescribe a period of time for
a claimant to file an administrative claim against the contra-party after
the occurrence of events forming the basis for the claim. The statute
contained two time limits.  On receipt of contractor’s claim, the Gov-
ernment had a sixty-day period to respond with a final decision.31  In
Prior to the entry of a final judgment by a court or a decision by an agency
BCA, however, the court or agency BCA shall require a defective certifica-
tion to be corrected.
28. L-3 Commc’ns Integrated Sys., L.P. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 325, 334
(2012) (claim submitted with putative certification that does not “at least resemble
the statutory language” is not “valid” and precludes the appeals tribunal from exercis-
ing jurisdiction); NileCo Gen. Contracting, LLC, ASBCA No. 60912, 17-1 BCA ¶
36,862, at 179,605 (because typewritten signature block does not qualify as required
signature on certification, board had no jurisdiction over contractor’s claim).
29. The CDA forums from time to time assert that “a claim need not be submitted
in any particular form or use any particular wording,” that the “request for a decision
can be implied from the context of the submission,” and that, in “determining
whether a contractor has submitted a claim, the Board applies a common sense analy-
sis on a case-by-case basis, examining the totality of the correspondence between the
parties.” Rover Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 60703, 17-1 BCA ¶ 36,682, at 178,613. In
general, however, any written assertion that does not track the specific requirements
of the “claim” definition in FAR 2.101 runs a high risk of disqualification as a “claim.”
30. Government contractors must heed the difference between the time to present
their claims to a contracting officer (six years from accrual) and the time to appeal
from a final decision on that claim (90 days to a BCA, one year to the COFC). A
CDA tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider a late appeal from a final decision even if
the contractor’s appeal is taken within the six years after accrual. Newtech Research
Sys., LLC v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 193, 208–09 (2011).
31. The statute prevents the government from sidestepping judicial review of a
contractor’s claim by providing that, if the officer does not timely issue a final decision
(generally, sixty days after receipt), the claim will be “deemed denied,” allowing the
contractor to appeal. 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f)(5) (2016). At the same time, the government
cannot assert the date a contractor’s claim will be “deemed denied” as triggering the
time to appeal. If the claim is deemed denied, the contractor is authorized to file suit
under 41 U.S.C. § 7103(f), but the contractor is not required to do so. Pathman Con-
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addition, the contractor had to file an appeal in a BCA or the COFC
within the applicable ninety-day or twelve-month period from receipt
of an agency contracting officer’s final decision (“COFD”).  The stat-
ute was silent on the passage of time between claim-creating events
and presentment of the claim to the other party. Further, CDA legisla-
tive history shows no consideration of a time limit for a party to assert
a claim, the threshold event for initiating the dispute process.  As a
result, parties were able to sit on potential “causes of action” for an
indefinite period after the other party’s breach or commission of other
injury. Other than possible equitable defenses, such as laches, unin-
tentional or strategic delays in submitting “claims” had no legal
consequence.32
The courts and boards, moreover, rejected litigant efforts to assert
limitations periods borrowed from other statutes. In response to stale
Government claims, contractors sought to invoke the six-year statute
of limitations in 28 U.S.C. § 2415, applicable to Government claims
for “money damages.” Section 2415 provided:
[E]very action for money damages brought by the United States or
an officer or agency thereof which is founded upon any contract
express or implied in law or fact, shall be barred unless the com-
plaint is filed within six years after the right of action accrues or
within one year after final decisions have been rendered in applica-
ble administrative proceedings required by contract or by law,
whichever is later. . . .
In 1985, the Federal Circuit held that § 2415 did not apply to a Gov-
ernment CDA claim. The court reasoned that, under the CDA, a Gov-
ernment “claim” is “not an ‘action for money damages brought by the
str. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1987). “[B]ecause the limita-
tions period begins to run upon receipt of a decision, the limitations period is only
triggered by a written decision, not by a deemed denial.” Patton v. United States, 74
Fed. Cl. 110, 115–16 (2006) (citing Pathman, 817 F.2d at 1576) (emphasis omitted).
See also Envtl. Safety Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 77, 91 (2010)
(“Under the CDA, upon receipt of a written claim from a contractor, a Contracting
Officer must issue a final decision within sixty days.”).
32. The CDA tribunals have never squarely held that laches is available as an
affirmative defense to a government claim. JANA, Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d
1265, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting “that it is not entirely clear whether the defense of
laches may be asserted against the government”). It appears that contractors have
rarely, if ever, prevailed on a laches defense, whether before or after FASA’s adop-
tion of a CDA statute of limitations. See, e.g., Northrop Grumman Corp., ASBCA
No. 57625, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,501 (“Assuming arguendo, that the equitable doctrine of
laches may be applied against the government under these circumstances . . . we be-
lieve that the claim was not unreasonably or inexcusably delayed.”); cf. Eurasia
Heavy Indus., ASBCA No. 52878, 01-2 BCA ¶ 31,574 (rejecting argument that gov-
ernment claim filed within six-year CDA limitations period cannot be barred by
laches as matter of law). The government appears to have had marginally better suc-
cess in asserting laches in response to “inexcusably delayed” contractor claims. See
JRS Mgmt., ASBCA No. 57238, 10-2 BCA ¶ 34,571 (12-year delay); Ahmed S. Al-
Zhickrulla Est., ASBCA No. 52137, 03-2 BCA ¶ 32,409 (7-year delay); Bieraeugel,
ASBCA No. 47145, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,536 (10-year delay).
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United States’ as expressly required by the statute. Instead, it is an
administrative appeal by a contractor from a contracting officer’s deci-
sion that the contractor owes the Government the amount of certain
disallowed costs.”33
In substance, of course, a Government claim to recoup unallowable
costs previously paid to a contractor is an “action for money dam-
ages.”  The decisions that rejected § 2415 as a surrogate statute of lim-
itations in defense of Government CDA claims nevertheless may be
justified by the more persuasive rationale that judges generally lack
the power to create law where the legislature has failed to act.  In-
deed, in connection with aged contractor CDA claims, the Federal
Circuit courts and BCAs relied on this principle in rejecting the Gov-
ernment’s assertion of the Tucker Act’s34 six-year limitations period.35
As a claims court decision explained:
Although defendant urges that the Claims Court’s general six-year
statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (1982), applies to a suit filed
pursuant to the CDA, this court recently held that the [only the]
CDA’s 12-month limitations period [to file an appeal] governs all
suits that are based on the CDA . . . . Plaintiff commenced this ac-
tion within 12 months after receipt of the contracting officer’s deci-
sion, although he had delayed for years in submitting his claim to
the contracting officer . . . . Allowing the contractor to proceed in
court under the circumstances present could have been avoided had
the CDA limited the time within which the contractor is required to
present his claim to a contracting officer. It did not. Even if defen-
dant’s argument is consistent with the CDA’s legislative goal of ar-
riving at prompt resolution of contract claims . . . the court’s
function is not to fashion a judicial bandage for an unfortunate gap
in legislation.36
33. S.E.R. Jobs for Progress, Inc. v. United States, 759 F.2d 1, 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
See also Motorola, Inc. v. West, 125 F.3d 1470, 1472–74 (Fed Cir. 1997) (although
Government agreed that its claim asserted in its final decision accrued more than six
years before submitted to contractor, claim not time-barred; section 2415(a) did not
apply, and FASA’s SOL did not apply retroactively to contracts entered before act).
See also Radiation Systems, Inc., ASBCA No. 41065, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,971 (applying
S.E.R. as binding Federal Circuit precedent).
34. The Tucker Act limitations provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2501, states: “Every claim of
which the United States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred un-
less the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.” En-
acted in 1887, the Tucker Act grants a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for suits
for money damages against the United States under express or implied contracts,
among other matters. Since inception, moreover, the limitations provision functions
as limiting the Court of Claims jurisdiction to timely filed claims. John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008).
35. Pathman Constr. Co. v. United States, 817 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
36. La Coste v. United States, 9 Cl. Ct. 313, 314–315 (1986).
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B. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994
To plug the “gap in legislation,” Congress created a limitations pe-
riod for CDA administrative claims in 1994 as part of the much
broader Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (“FASA”).37 “FASA
was intended, as its name suggests, to streamline and simplify federal
acquisition procedures.38 [FASA] was the product of Congress’ con-
clusion that the entire federal procurement regime had become a
‘complex and unwieldy system.’”39
Prior to FASA, there were occasional, aborted efforts in Congress
to create a CDA statute of limitations. In particular, in 1985 and 1986,
bills were introduced in the Senate that would have barred payment
on any contractor claim submitted to a contracting officer more than
“18 months after the date of the event on which the claim is based”40
or “arising out of events occurring more than 18 months before the
submission of the claim, request, or demand.”41 According to its pro-
ponents, the proposed legislation responded to complaints from the
Justice Department, backed up by a study of the (then) General Ac-
counting Office, that “contractors often wait years before submitting
claims for payment, thereby making adjudication of disputes diffi-
cult.”42 The proposed amendments contained no limitations period for
Government claims against contractors. These proposals, however,
never became law.
The momentum to add a CDA limitations period picked up in the
early 1990s and came to fruition as part of FASA’s enactment. The
original Senate version43 required both the Government and contrac-
tors to submit administrative claims “within 6 years after the occur-
rence of the event or events giving rise to the claim.” (emphasis
added).44 The accompanying Senate report explained that the provi-
sion would amend the CDA “to clarify the periods for filing claims”—
an enigmatic remark, given that there had been no limitations period
in need of “clarification.”45
37. See generally Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
355, 108 Stat. 3243.
38. See S. Rep. No. 103-259, at 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2598,
2598.
39. Corel Corp. v. U.S., 165 F. Supp. 2d 12, 20 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing S. Rep. No.
103-258, at 2 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2561, 2563).
40. 131 CONG. REC. 12,962 (1985) (offered as amendment to National Defense
Authorization Act of 1986, S. 1160).
41. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified as
amended at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109 (2012)).
42. 132 CONG. REC. 10,075–76 (1986) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
43. 132 CONG. REC. 26,205, 26,233 (1986); Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, §2552, 108 Stat. 3243.
44. S. 1587, 103rd Cong. § 2351 (1994) (enacted).
45. See 103 CONG. REC. 26,256 (1993) (“Sec. 2552 would amend the Contract Dis-
putes Act to clarify the periods for filing claims.”).
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Ultimately, a revised Senate bill, which became law, and adopting in
all material respects the current language, provided:
Each claim by a contractor against the Government relating to a
contract and each claim by the Government against a contractor
relating to a contract shall be submitted within 6 years after the ac-
crual of the claim. The preceding sentence does not apply to a claim
by the Government against a contractor that is based on a claim by
the contractor involving fraud.46
The FASA amendment to the CDA, however, did not define “ac-
crual.” The record sheds no light on what Congress intended by the
term. There is no indication, for example, whether “accrual” reflected
a rejection, or a mere truncation, of the earlier version of the bill’s
language requiring submission of a claim within the six-year period
“after the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the claim”—
or something else altogether. The final language appears to have been
slipped into the Senate amendment with no record of any comment,
discussion, or debate about the meaning of the statutorily undefined
“accrual,” including reference to any other federal statutes of limita-
tions as a model or source material.
Legislative inattention may also explain the apparent double-mean-
ing of the word “claim” in the limitations amendment that “[e]ach
claim . . . relating to a contract shall be submitted within [six] years
after the accrual of the claim.” The reviewing tribunals apply two dis-
tinct meanings to “claim”—notwithstanding the “vigorous” presump-
tion that the same words in the same sentence of a statute have the
same meaning.47 The judiciary reflexively construes the “claim” that
must “be submitted” in accordance the FAR 2.101 definition—a writ-
ten assertion that conforms with the technical requirements of a
“claim” necessary to BCA or COFC jurisdiction.  In contrast, “claim”
in “after the accrual of the claim” is given its typical legal meaning—
that is, “cause of action,” and not the FAR definition.48
The case law has not examined the fact of “claim’s” double-mean-
ing in the “accrual” provision.  This may be due in part to the obvious
46. 140 CONG. REC. 15,977 (1994). In the 2011 recodification, Congress changed
“government” to “Federal Government” and broke out the last sentence to a new
subsection 7103(4)(b).
47. “[T]he presumption that a given term is used to mean the same thing through-
out a statute is at its most vigorous when a term is repeated within a given sentence.”
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994). On the other hand, the “same words,
same meaning” rule of thumb is by no means an inflexible canon of statutory con-
struction. See Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082 (2015) (“In law as in life,
however, the same words, placed in different contexts, sometimes mean different
things . . . We have several times affirmed that identical language may convey varying
content when used in different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the
same statute.”).
48. But see Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, 823 F.3d 622, 626
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[f]ixing the date of accrual of a claim requires first that there is a
“claim” as defined in the Contract Disputes Act and associated Regulations”).
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incongruity in using the FAR definition to determine “accrual” of a
“claim.”  It would be nonsensical to construe a “claim” to “accrue”
only upon its reduction to a writing that asserts “as a matter of right,
the payment of money in a sum certain,” accompanied by a certifica-
tion, along with the other statutory and regulatory bells and whistles
of a CDA “claim.”  Indeed, if the FAR defined the “claim” that “ac-
crues,” no “claim” could ever be untimely.  The limitations period
would begin and end simultaneously on submission of a jurisdiction-
ally valid “claim.”49
Conversely, it is not obvious that, in enacting FASA, Congress in-
tended the “claim” that “shall be submitted within 6 years” to be
given the technical and restrictive definition in the FAR.  The little
legislative history relevant to the CDA’s statute of limitations does
not to refer to the FAR’s definition of “claim,” or even reflect aware-
ness that CDA tribunals had been rejecting appeals for lack of “juris-
diction” for claims that did not conform to the FAR definition.  If it
could be said to have “intended” anything, Congress reasonably may
have intended that a claimant’s unadorned written assertion of an ac-
crued would stop the limitations clock.  To date, there do not appear
to be any decisions to consider that proposition.50
C. Statute of Limitations:  From “Jurisdictional”
to “Claims Processing”
One of the first significant issues under the FASA amendment was
whether timely presentment of a claim was necessary for CDA forum
subject matter jurisdiction. “Filing deadlines ordinarily are not juris-
dictional,” according to the Supreme Court.51 This is true of most
“statutes of limitations,” which typically function as an affirmative de-
fense on which the respondent bears the burden of proof. A respon-
dent, moreover, may waive an affirmative statute of limitations
defense. Filing deadlines, however, sometimes may be “jurisdic-
tional,” in that non-compliance with the filing deadline deprives a
court or forum from exercising any power to consider the claim.
Under “jurisdictional” limitations periods, the claimant, as proponent
of jurisdiction, bears the burden to prove that he or she timely filed
49. The FAR definition of “claim” predated FASA by at least ten years. Under
ordinary rules of statutory construction, that would raise a presumption that Congress
intended the FAR definition of “claim” to apply the CDA statute adopted in FASA.
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–81 (1978) (“Congress is presumed to be aware of
an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpreta-
tion when it re-enacts a statute without change . . . [or] adopts a new law incorporat-
ing sections of a prior law, . . . at least insofar as [the prior interpretation] affects the
new statute”). The absurdity of applying the FAR definition of “claim” as the object
of “accrue” would be enough to rebut any such presumption.
50. But see Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, 823 F.3d 622, 627
(Fed. Cir. 2016) discussed infra p 50.
51. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011).
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the claim. In recent years, the Supreme Court has been emphatic that
statutory filing deadlines are “jurisdictional” only where “Congress
has clearly stated that the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear
statement, [the Court has] cautioned [that] courts should treat the re-
striction as nonjurisdictional in character.”52
The CDA statute of limitations contains no “clear statement” that
the filing of a claim within six years of “accrual” is jurisdictional. Nev-
ertheless, in 2006, the ASBCA concluded that the amendment’s
“placement” in what it called the “jurisdictional” section of the statute
dictated that the limitations period should be treated as a jurisdic-
tional gateway:
Section [7103(a)] as implemented by FAR subpart 33.2, Disputes
and Appeals, is the key provision in determining whether there is a
proper or formal claim for purposes of the CDA . . . . FASA added
the six-year requirement to this key provision, rather than, for ex-
ample, to 41 U.S.C. § [7104(a) and (b)], establishing filing periods at
the boards and the United States Court of Federal Claims. We con-
clude, in view of the placement of the six-year provision in
§ [7103(a)], that the requirement that a claim be submitted within
six years after its accrual, like the other requirements in that section,
is jurisdictional.53
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in 2009 reached the same
conclusion:
The six-year presentment period is part of the requirement in sec-
tion [1703(a)] that all claims by a contractor against the Govern-
ment be submitted to the contracting officer for a decision. This
court has held that the presentment of claims to a contracting of-
ficer under section [1703(a)] is a prerequisite to suit in the Court of
Federal Claims or review by a board of contract appeals. England v.
Swanson Group, 353 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Sharman Co.
v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Statutory time
restrictions on the submission of administrative claims are a part of
the requirement that a party must satisfy to properly exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies . . . . Therefore . . . the timely submission of a
claim to a contracting officer is a necessary predicate to the exercise
of jurisdiction by a court or a board of contract appeals over a con-
tract dispute governed by the CDA.54
52. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2005).
53. Gray Personnel, Inc., ASBCA No. 54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378 at 165,475 (cita-
tions omitted). In an earlier decision, the ASBCA had concluded without discussion
that the “statute of limitations and laches are affirmative defenses that do not go to
the jurisdiction of the Board.” Woodside Summit Group, Inc., ASBCA No. 54554, 05-
2 BCA ¶ 33,113 at 164,102. Gray dismissed this as “dictum.” Gray Personnel, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378 at 165,475 n.2.
54. Arctic Slope Native Ass’n v. Sebelius, 583 F.3d 785, 793 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (cita-
tion omitted). See also Sys. Dev. Corp. v. McHugh, 686 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (following Arctic Slope).
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With timely submission a jurisdictional requirement, the party as-
serting the claim bore the burden to prove “presentment” within six
years of “accrual.” In practice, respondents frequently challenged
claims at the outset by filing a motion for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. In response, the claimant had to establish by a preponderance
of evidence that its claim “accrued” within the six-year window. As a
challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the CDA forums typically de-
cided motions to dismiss for untimely filing before addressing the
merits or permitting discovery.
In 2014, however, the Federal Circuit abruptly reversed course, and
held that the six-year limitations period was not jurisdictional.55 The
Court ruled:
Our decision in Systems Development was effectively overruled by
the Supreme Court’s more recent decision in the latest in a series of
Supreme Court opinions that have articulated a more stringent test
for determining when statutory time limits are jurisdictional. . . .
The Court articulated a “readily administrable bright line” rule,
under which the inquiry is “whether Congress has clearly stated that
the rule is jurisdictional; absent such a clear statement, [the Court
has] cautioned [that] courts should treat the restriction as nonjuris-
dictional in character.” [citations omitted] Congress need not “in-
cant magic words [‘jurisdictional’] in order to speak clearly,” and
render the provision jurisdictional. . . . Here, § 7103 “does not speak
in jurisdictional terms” or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the
Claims Court. . . . [Section] 7103 does not have any special charac-
teristic that would warrant making an exception to the general rule
that filing deadlines are not jurisdictional. We conclude that § 7103
is not jurisdictional and need not be addressed before deciding the
merits.
Sikorsky had a swift impact on CDA litigation. The decision effec-
tively rendered moot dozens of pending motions to dismiss based on
untimely presentment.  The burden shifted to respondents to prove
untimeliness—a burden rarely met at the pleadings stage.  Early exit
would now have to wait until the summary judgment stage, where the
respondent must demonstrate that there are no material facts in dis-
pute and that the claim is untimely as a matter of law.  In an appeal of
a contractor claim against the Government, the Civil Board of Con-
tract Appeals summarized Sikorsky’s impact:
The transformation of the CDA’s six-year statute of limitations
from jurisdictional to non-jurisdictional changes how we must ap-
proach a motion to dismiss a case for failure to meet that deadline.
No longer can the Government through a motion to dismiss, chal-
lenge the factual allegations that the contractor has made in its com-
plaint and require the contractor to prove jurisdictional facts by a
preponderance of the evidence. Instead, the CDA’s six-year statute
55. Sikorksy Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
2019] THE CONTRACT DISPUTE ACT’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 73
of limitations is now an affirmative defense that the Government
must plead in its answer to the appellant’s complaint. . .. [T] he bur-
den is on the Government, not the appellant, to prove its affirma-
tive defense that the contractor’s claim is time-barred. . .[T]he party
seeking to enforce the limitations period must do so using the same
procedural rules that the Board applies to other non-jurisdictional
issues: motions for failure to state a claim, summary [judgment],
and, if there are genuine issues of material fact relating to the stat-
ute of limitations issue, a hearing or record submission to resolve
competing versions of the facts.56
IV. THE CONCEPT OF CLAIM “ACCRUAL” UNDER THE CDA
As noted, the FASA Congress did not define the pivotal term “ac-
crual” in creating a CDA limitations period.  Instead, the Government
agencies charged with Federal Acquisition Regulation rule-making
(convening a “FAR Council”) promulgated a definition on their own
initiative. They defined accrual ostensibly under their statutory gen-
eral power to implement “requirements for protests and disputes in
Government procurement.”57  In September 1995, the agencies issued
a final rule defining “accrual.”  Since the agencies’ decision, the judici-
ary itself has not undertaken to interpret the statutory meaning of “ac-
crue.”  Instead, the Federal Circuit courts and BCAs have applied the
regulatory definition by virtual default.
A. Regulatory Definition of “Accrue”
In early January 1995, the FAR Councils issued a proposed rule,
drafted by the interagency drafting team responsible for FAR Case
94–730, “Protests, Disputes, and Appeals,” in an effort to clarify the
provision that each CDA claim “shall be submitted within 6 years after
the accrual of the claim.” The proposed rule would have added the
following section 33.206 of FAR, “Initiation of a claim”:
(a) Contractor claims shall be submitted, in writing, to the con-
tracting officer for a decision within six years after the contractor
knew or should have known the facts and circumstances giving rise to
the issue in controversy unless a shorter time period has been agreed
to. . . .
(b) The contracting officer shall issue a written decision on any
Government claim initiated against a contractor within six years af-
ter accrual of the claim. The six-year period shall not apply to a
Government claim against a contractor that is based on a claim by
the contractor involving fraud.
56. Sys. Mgmt. & Research Techs. Corp. v. DOE, 2015 CIVBCA LEXIS 176, *13-
14, 2015-1 B.C.A. (CCH) P35,976 (B.C.A. May 12, 2015).
57. Federal Acquisition Regulation; Protests, Disputes, and Appeals, 60 Fed. Reg.
2630 (proposed Jan. 10, 1995).
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In response, almost all commentators criticized the rule’s language
regarding the “initiation of a [contractor or Government] claim” for
lack of parallelism.  Under the draft language, a contractor had to
bring its claim within six years after the contractor “knew or should
have known of the facts and circumstances giving rise to the issue in
controversy.” The Government, on the other hand, had to submit its
claims within the six years after “accrual”—left undefined in the draft.
Reacting to the criticism, the drafting team prepared a revised “draft
final rule” that, among other things, included a new general definition
of “accrual.”58 The draft final rule included the following definition:
Accrual of a claim occurs on the date when the facts and circum-
stances giving rise to the issue in controversy and the resulting dam-
age were known or should have been known. In any event, all
claims accrue not later than the date of contract completion, except
for Government claims concerning latent defects or Government
claims based on contractor claims involving fraud.
The draft final rule also revised new section 33.206 of FAR to provide
both contractor and Government claims were required to be submit-
ted “within [six] years after accrual of the claim.”
The majority of those who commented, from both the private and
Government agency communities, again remonstrated, this time
strongly critical of the proposal’s “discovery” standard language—that
a claim would not accrue until the claimant “knew or should have
known” of the facts constituting the cause of action. Instead, commen-
tators urged the Councils to adopt the standard of “accrual” the courts
had applied under the Tucker Act59—the statutory language of which
is substantively identical to the CDA and, similarly, does not define
“accrual.”60 Under the Tucker Act precedent (referred to in the regu-
58. Memorandum for Agency Contact Points from Edward C. Loeb, Deputy Pro-
ject Manager, on Review of FAR Case 94-730, PROTESTS, DISPUTES, AND APPEALS
11–12 (May 26, 1995).
59. In particular, many cited the rule as stated in the Tucker Act decision. Japa-
nese War Notes Claimants Ass’n v. United States, 373 F.2d. 356, 358–59 (Ct. Cl.
1966). See, e.g., Letter from American Bar Association, Section on Public Contracts,
to General Services Administration, FAR Secretariat, re: FAR Case 94-730, PRO-
TESTS, DISPUTES, AND APPEALS (Mar. 10, 1995) (“The Section’s recommendation
would adopt the definition of accrual that has been developed under the Tucker Act.
Japanese War Notes Claimants Association v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 630, 632
(1977). This test is well understood and has been applied in numerous cases.”); Mem-
orandum of Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, to Deputy Undersec-
retary of Defense for Acquisition Reform, re: FAR Case 94-730, PROTESTS,
DISPUTES, AND APPEALS (June 9, 1995) (citing Japanese War Notes standard); DLA
[Defense Logistics Agency] Comments on FAR Case 94-730, PROTESTS, DISPUTES,
AND APPEALS (Mar. 14, 1995) (citing Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n. v. United
States, 373 F.2d 356, 358 (Ct. Cl. 1966)).
60. Compare the Tucker Act language, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (“Every claim . . . shall be
barred unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after such claim first ac-
crues”), with the CDA Language, 41 U.S.C. 7103(a)(4) (“Each claim . . . shall be
submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the claim”).
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latory history as the Japanese War Notes standard61 by a prominent
Tucker Act case), a claim accrues “when all the events have occurred
which fix the alleged liability of the United States and entitle the
claimant to institute an action.”62 Put simply, the period commences
on the occurrence of events that create a cause of action. Accrual is
not contingent on whether or when the claimant “knew or should
have known” of those events.63
Despite significant resistance, the FAR Council decided to adopt a
“discovery” standard.  In issuing what became the final rule, the draft-
ing team stated the following:
We have included a known or should have known known standard
for discovery. Many pricing defect cases have their original events at
the beginning of the contract or on contract award, but often cannot
be discovered by the Government until years later. Therefore, the
discovery requirement must remain. As to having the claim accrue
upon discovery of damages, we agree to include discovery of dam-
age as an element of the definition. We did not limit claim submis-
61. 178 Ct. Cl. 630, 632 (1977).
62. Since 1883, the federal claims courts have held that a Tucker Act claim accrues
on occurrence of the events, that timely filing was necessary to establish a court’s
jurisdiction over an action, and that “equitable tolling” could not extend the absolute
six-year limit. Such a strict approach followed the historical practice of “limiting the
scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity.” John R. Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008). See Japanese War Notes Claimants Associ-
ation v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 630, 632 (1977) (“a claim first accrues when all the
events have occurred which fix the alleged liability of the United States and entitle
the claimant to institute an action”). Accord, Hart v. United States, 910 F.2d 815, 817
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (“[a] claim first accrues and the six-year statute of limitations begins
to run (28 U.S.C. § 2501), ‘when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of
the Government and entitle the claimant to institute an action.’ Kinsey v. United
States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Oceanic Steamship Co. v. United
States, 165 Ct. Cl. 217, 225 (1964))”; Reliance Motors, Inc. v. United States, 112 Ct.
Cl. 324, 328 (1948) (“The general rule is that a claim accrues, within the meaning of
the statute . . . when all the events have occurred which fix the liability of the United
States to a claimant and which entitle such person to sue thereon”).
63. See Letter from Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations to Gen-
eral Services Administration, FAR Secretariat, re: FAR Case 94-730, PROTESTS, DIS-
PUTES, AND APPEALS 3 (Mar. 10, 1995) (noting that, if following Tucker Act meaning
of “accrue,” “it is not relevant to the accrual of a claim ‘when the contractor knew or
should have known the facts and circumstances giving rise to the controversy,” citing
Brown, “The New Time Limits on Contract Claims under the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994,” 63 Federal Contracts Report 32 (BNA Jan, 9, 1995)); Let-
ter from American Bar Association, Section on Public Contracts, to General Services
Administration, FAR Secretariat, re: FAR Case 94-730, PROTESTS, DISPUTES, AND
APPEALS 11-12 (Mar. 10, 1995) (“The Section’s recommended definition of “accrual”
would make clear that a general discovery rule would not apply to proposed contract
claims under the Contract Disputes Act. . . . As a policy matter, the Section’s recom-
mended definition would encourage a reasonably prompt investigation and assertion
of potential claims. The six-year limitations period is already sufficiently generous
without confusing the matter by creating an issue over when the limitation period has
started to accrue.”)
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sions to six years after contract completion in order to avoid
litigation over the definition of contract completion.64
The drafters further explained that the team did not accept the pro-
position, urged by commentators that the Japanese War Notes stan-
dard was incompatible with a “discovery” standard. On the contrary,
it remarked that “[w]e retained the ‘knew or should have known’ lan-
guage based on Catellus Development Corp. v. United States,65 and a
damages element under Shermco Industries v. United States.66 Both
cases are in the Japanese War Notes series of cases.”67 The definition
of “accrual” published in the final rule, added to FAR 33.201, states
the following:
Accrual of a claim occurs on the date when all events, which fix the
alleged liability of either the Government or the contractor and per-
mit assertion of the claim, were known or should have been known.
For liability to be fixed, some injury must have occurred. However,
monetary damages need not have been incurred.68
The foregoing regulatory history demonstrates that the FAR Coun-
cil purported to rely on Tucker Act case law to define “accrual,” in-
cluding the “knew or should have known” “discovery” language. Its
reliance on the Japanese War Notes series of cases to justify the “knew
or should have known” discovery rule standard for the CDA, how-
ever, is questionable. A Tucker Act claim does not accrue on discov-
ery:  it accrues on occurrence of the events that create a claim. Under
the “accrual suspension” exception to this rule, accrual may be “sus-
pended” only if the claimant can make an extraordinary showing that
the respondent concealed the facts, or the injury is “inherently un-
knowable.” In those “rare circumstances,”69 “the statute will not begin
64. Most commentators had argued against using the date of contract completion
as the last date for accrual, claiming that contract “completion date” is an “undefined
concept . . . likely to vary on contract type and individual fact situation. Memorandum
of Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, to Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition Reform, re: FAR Case 94-730, PROTESTS, DISPUTES, AND
APPEALS 2 (June 9, 1995).
65. Catellus Development Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 399 (1994).
66. Shermco Industries v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 588 (1984).
67. Memorandum from Craig E. Hodge, Chair of drafting committee, Department
of the Army, for Captain Barry L. Cohan, Acting Assistant Deputy Undersecretary
for Defense (Acquisition Process and Policies), re: Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act of 1994—FAR Part 33, FAR Case 94-730 (31 July 1995) at 2.  Whether mindfully
or not, the drafting committee citation to the “Japanese War Notes [(i.e., Tucker Act)]
series of cases” for language to create a “discovery rule” accrual standard was mis-
leading. As noted above, under the Tucker Act, a “should have known” inquiry only
applies to “suspend” a claim that has accrued in extraordinary circumstances in which
claimant can show that the respondent concealed the operative facts or that its claim
was “inherently unknowable.”
68. 60 Fed. Reg. 48224 (Sept. 18, 1995).
69. Michael v. United States, 642 Fed. Appx. 987, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (accrual
“suspended” only in “rare circumstances in which ‘the government concealed its acts
or the plaintiff’s injury was ‘inherently unknowable’”).
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to run until a plaintiff learns or reasonably should have learned of his
cause of action.” This exception is “strictly and narrowly applied.”70
Japanese War Notes made this point with an oft-repeated example of
an injury that is “‘inherently unknowable’ at the accrual date:”
An example of the latter would be when defendant delivers the
wrong type of fruit tree to plaintiff and the wrong cannot be deter-
mined until the tree bears fruit. . . . In this situation the statute will
not begin to run until plaintiff learns or reasonably should have
learned of his cause of action. . . . Once the plaintiff is on inquiry
that it has a potential claim, the statute can start to run.71
Thus, to craft and promote a CDA “discovery” standard, the FAR
Council dubiously borrowed from the “rare” exception to the Tucker
Act’s harsh, non-discovery standard. The ambiguity in judicial effects
to define when a CDA claim accrues arguably reflects the FAR Coun-
cils’ attempt to cross-breed fundamentally incompatible accrual
standards.
Except for non-substantive changes, the definition of “accrual”
under FAR 33.201 has remained in place.72 Without analysis, and
without any judicial exegesis of Congressional intent behind the
phrase “accrual of the claim,” the CDA forums adopted the FAR defi-
nition in deciding whether a claim “has been submitted within [six]
years after [its] accrual” under section 7103(4) (a).73
B. Gray Personnel
In Gray Personnel, Inc.,74 the ASBCA first addressed the FAR’s
“accrual” definition.  The Board’s decision established the framework
70. “The “suspension” of accrual of a claim on occurrence of the underlying
events is “‘strictly and narrowly applied’ and requires a plaintiff to show either (1)
‘that defendant has concealed its acts with the result that plaintiff was unaware of
their existence,’ or (2) ‘that [the plaintiff’s] injury was inherently unknowable at the
accrual date.’” Brizuela v. United States, 492 Fed. Appx. 97, 99–100 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
“When a claim is inherently unknowable it does not mean that the claim is ‘somewhat
difficult to discover,’ or is ‘not entirely obvious.’ That which is inherently unknowable
is that which is unknowable by its very essence, i.e., its existence at the critical mo-
ment simply cannot be ascertained.” Catellus Dev. Corp. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl.
399, 407 (1994).
71. (emphasis added) 178 Ct. Cl. at 364.
72. Federal Acquisition Regulation; Protests, Disputes, and Appeals, 66 Fed. Reg.
2132 (Jan. 10, 2001) (codified at 48 FAR 33.201).
73. See, e.g., Lord Corp., ASBCA No. 54940, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,314, at 165,168 (citing
and applying FAR 33.201’s definition without attempt to interpret “accrual” in CDA);
Axion Corp. v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 468, 480, (2005) (noting that “the Contract
Disputes Act does not define when a claim “accrues”; cites and applies FAR defini-
tion without examining meaning of “accrual” in CDA). But see Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, “deference is not due [a regulatory definition of a statutory term]
unless a ‘court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,’ is left with an
unresolved ambiguity. . . . Where, as here, the canons supply an answer, ‘Chevron
leaves the stage.’”)
74. See generally Gray Personnel, Inc., ASBCA No. 54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378.
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for CDA statute of limitations analysis and articulated several impor-
tant precepts that recur frequently in subsequent litigation. Accord-
ingly, the decision’s salient facts and rationale merit some attention.
In Gray, the Army in May 1997 awarded a fixed price contract to
appellant to provide nursing services to Walter Reed Memorial Hospi-
tal for veterans. The fixed price for Gray’s provision of nursing staff
was based on estimated “full time equivalents” at specific hourly labor
costs. Under the contract’s “requirements” clause, the contractor pro-
vided the services only upon authorized delivery or task orders. In
October 1997, the Army began issuing a series of delivery orders that
in effect significantly increased the staffing the contractor needed to
provide. To meet the demand, the contractor was forced to retain and
pay more nurses on an “as needed” basis, resulting in contractor costs
in excess of the contract’s scheduled rates. As a result, Gray’s costs
exceeded the fixed price, resulting in a loss by the time the contract
was completed in May 2002.
In April 2004, Gray submitted a claim for the increased costs under
all of the delivery orders, which the Army denied in full. On Gray’s
appeal, the Army argued that the statute of limitations barred the
contractor’s claim in its entirety. It contended that the contractor
knew in October 1997, more than six years before it submitted its
claim, that the Army had constructively changed the contract. The
contractor, on the other hand, argued that it could not have known
the amount of money damages until it completed the contract. The
Board rejected both arguments, settling on a middle ground. In the
process, it made several important rulings.
First, the Board laid down the threshold inquiry for deciding a CDA
statute of limitations dispute: “[t]o determine when liability is fixed,
we start by examining the legal basis of the particular claim.” In the
case before the Board, the “legal basis” was a claim for “constructive
change” through delivery orders that enlarged the contractor’s obliga-
tions. Under the particular requirements contract,” the contractor had
no obligation to provide services, and the Government had no obliga-
tion to pay, except under specific delivery orders issued from time to
time.  The Board held:
Absent a delivery order . . . no performance was required. We con-
clude that the Government’s potential liability for enlarging appel-
lant’s performance could not be “fixed” until the Government had
issued a delivery order authorizing performance, and required ap-
pellant to provide “as needed” services under that order.75
Second, the Board rejected the contractor’s argument that its claim
did not “accrue” until it completed the contract. It held:
The second and third sentences of the definition in FAR 33.201
state that in order for liability to be fixed “some injury must have
75. Id. at 165, 475.
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occurred,” but “monetary damages need not have been incurred.”
. . . Accordingly, appellant must have actually begun performance
and incurred some extra costs for liability to be fixed. We do not
think, however, that appellant must have completed the delivery or-
der, or even, as appellant argues, have completed the contract in
order for liability to be fixed. The CDA permits contractors to sub-
mit claims before they have incurred the total costs relating to the
claim. Indeed, the Congressional intent was that “contractors . . .
submit claims as soon as they are identified.”76
Third, the Board ruled that the contractor “knew or should have
known” of the events that fixed the Government’s liability “at the
time of those events.” Citing Japanese War Notes,77 the Board ruled:
“Once a party is on notice that it has a potential claim, the statute of
limitations can start to run.”78 Applying that “notice” concept, the
Board rejected the contractor’s assertion that its claim did not accrue
until it subjectively “recognized” the reasons for the “cost impact.”
Finally, the Board disagreed with the Government’s argument that
the appellant’s entire claim accrued on the initial delivery order in
October 1997.  Rather, the statute only barred the claim to the extent
it sought recovery for work performed on delivery orders more than
six years before the contractor presented its claim—a conclusion that
naturally followed the Board’s determination that Government liabil-
ity for enlargement of the contractor’s performance became “fixed”
on an order by order basis. Gray arguably complicated the analysis,
however, by espousing a “doctrine”—the “continuing claims doc-
trine”—to justify its decision.  According to this “doctrine,” which the
Board also borrowed from Tucker Act precedent:
We disagree [with argument that the claim should be barred in its
entirety] because we believe the “continuing claim” doctrine devel-
oped under the Tucker Act is applicable here. As explicated in
Brown Park Estates-Fairfield Development Co. v. United States, 127
F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1997). . .periodic pay claims arising more
than six years prior to suit are barred, but not those arising within
the six-year span. . . . In order for the continuing claim doctrine to
apply, the plaintiff’s claim must be inherently susceptible to being
broken down into a series of independent and distinct events or
wrongs, each having its own associated damages. . . . However, a
claim based upon a single distinct event, which may have continued
ill effects later on, is not a continuing claim.
76. Id. (citations omitted; emphasis added)
77. In pertinent part, 28 U.S.C. § 2501 states: “Every claim of which the United
States Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition
thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.”
78. Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n of the Philippines, Inc. v. United States,
178 Ct. Cl. 630, 634 (1967) (holding that, under § 2501, under the accrual suspension
rule, “[o]nce plaintiff is on inquiry that it has a potential claim, the statute can start to
run.”).
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The board concluded that, in this case, “appellant’s claim is inherently
susceptible to being broken down into a series of independent and
distinct events, viz., the changes to the individual delivery orders.”79
Gray created the paradigm for analyzing CDA statute of limitations
disputes. It established—albeit without analysis—that the definition
of “accrual” drafted by regulators in FAR 33.201 determines when a
claim “accrues” under the CDA. Gray further framed the two funda-
mental two-step inquiry in any given case: What are the “events” that
“fix the alleged liability” and “permit assertion of the claim,” and
when did the claimant know or should have known of the events.  It
also articulated the analytical tool that the “events that fix” liability
require an examination of the “legal basis of the particular claim.” As
Gray illustrated, that analysis does not start and stop with the claim-
ant’s legal cause of action (e.g., breach of contract). Rather, a tribunal
must look at the claimant’s theory of its case—the facts and circum-
stances by which the claimant intends to establish his or her cause of
action. Consistent with treating the definition of accrual as a “discov-
ery rule,” as the FAR Council intended,80 moreover, Gray also held
that the statute is triggered not by the events that “fix the liability,”
but only when a “party is on notice” of those events.
Gray crafted a durable template for CDA limitations decisions. As
discussed below, however, later cases deviate from Gray’s “notice”
accrual test—and, indeed, are equivocal on whether or what type of
“discovery rule” applies.
V. CDA CLAIM ACCRUAL—ISSUES AND APPLICATION
The decisions by the CDA forums under the statute of limitations
do not yield any clearly defined and consistently applied principles
across the universe of cases.  For practitioners and students, the cases
are not uniform in analysis and do not create any well-defined
roadmap to predictable results. This Section tries to unravel some of
the knots in the most fundamental statements of the accrual standard
and examines how the statute has been applied in the more typical
and significant types of CDA disputes.
A. Issues in Defining the Standard
1. “Knew or Should Have Known”
The CDA tribunals have been inconsistent at best in interpreting
and applying the FAR definition of “accrual;” that is “the date when
79. Gray Personnel, Inc. ASBCA No. 54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378 at 165,476. Be-
cause no part of the contractor’s claim accrued until the Army “fixed” its liability by
issuing specific delivery orders that enlarged performance, the invocation of a distinct
“doctrine” to reject the government’s argument that the entire claim accrued on the
first such delivery order would appear gratuitous.
80. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 33.201.
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all events, which fix the alleged liability . . . and permit assertion of the
claim, were known or should have been known.” The decisions create
confusion by relying, in substantial part, on Tucker Act precedent,81
stating that a claim accrues at the time of the underlying operative
events unless that information is concealed or “inherently unknow-
able.” More importantly, regardless of differing formulations of the
legal standard, a close examination of the decisions show that a claim-
ant will be time-barred only if aware, or in actual possession of, the
facts underlying the claim more than six years before presentment. As
applied, only actual knowledge or possession of the information of the
facts that make out a claim will trigger the statute.
A limitations period triggered when the claimant “knew or should
have known” the facts of its claim is the classic formulation of a “dis-
covery rule.” Under a “discovery rule,” the occurrence of events un-
derlying a claim is necessary, but not sufficient, for “accrual.” In
general, the limitations period cannot commence at least until a claim-
ant knows (or “should know”) information “that would lead a reason-
able person to begin investigating the possibility that his legal rights
had been infringed.”82 Under an “inquiry notice” version, the limita-
tions period begins to run when a “reasonable person” in the claim-
ant’s position would have learned the operative facts while exercising
due diligence.83 Gray’s conclusion that the statute of limitations starts
to run “[o]nce a party is on notice that it has a potential claim” seem-
ingly endorsed an “inquiry notice” type of discovery rule.
After Gray, the ASBCA’s habit of borrowing language from Tucker
Act decisions has sidelined any “inquiry notice” or similar discovery
rule analysis.  In Raytheon Missile Systems, for example, the ASBCA
cited Tucker Act precedent to hold that that the “events fixing liability
should have been known when they occurred unless they can be rea-
sonably found to have been either concealed or ‘inherently unknow-
81. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006).
82. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 650 (2010) (quoting Franze v. Equita-
ble Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.  2002). There are myriad variants of the
“discovery rule,” under which the limitations period may commence at the moment of
“notice” or at some other defined point. See 559 U.S. 633, 650 (2010) (quoting Franze
v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th Cir.  2002)) (noting at least three
types of “discovery” rules:  (i) period triggered “when information puts plaintiffs on
‘inquiry notice’ of the need for investigation”; (ii) period deferred “if plaintiff does
investigate,” and begins to run “from the date such inquiry should have revealed the
fraud”; and (iii) period begins “only when a reasonably diligent plaintiff, after being
put on “inquiry notice,” should have discovered facts constituting violation”).
83. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 30 (2001) (The discovery rule would trigger
the limitations period at [the] point [that] a reasonable person in [plaintiff’s] position
would have learned of the injury in the exercise of due diligence.); See Stone v. Wil-
liams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1049 (2d Cir. 1992) (“The duty of inquiry having arisen, plaintiff
is charged with whatever knowledge an inquiry would have revealed.”); 2 C. Corman,
Limitation of Actions § 11.1.6, p. 164 (1991) (“It is obviously unreasonable to charge
the plaintiff with failure to search for the missing element of the cause of action if
such element would not have been revealed by such search.”).
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able’ at that time.”84  This formulation upended the language of FAR
33.201, which by definition states that no CDA claim “accrues” unless
and until the claimant knew or should have known about the underly-
ing facts regardless of when the events occurred. Contrary to the
Tucker Act case law—and Raytheon Missile Systems—under FAR
33.201, there is no presumption that “events fixing liability should
have been known when they occurred.”85  In a “discovery rule”
scheme, “concealment” or “inherently unknowability” may be rele-
vant to determining when a claimant knew or should have known of
the facts supporting a claim.  But those concepts are not integral to
the standard or constitute a threshold that a claimant must overcome
to ensure that the trier will undertake the “knew or should have
known” discovery analysis.
Just three months after Raytheon Missiles Systems, the ASBCA in
Raytheon Space & Airborne appeared to revert to a more traditional
discovery type of rule, but only after further jamming the square peg
of Tucker Act cases into the round hole of FAR’s 31.201 discovery
rule. Raytheon Space86 restated the accrual analysis as follows:
A claim accrues when “all events, that fix the alleged liability . . .
and permit assertion of the claim, were known or should have been
known,” and some injury has occurred.87 The events fixing liability
should have been known when they occurred unless they can be
reasonably found to have been either concealed or inherently un-
knowable at that time.88 The “concealed or inherently unknowable”
test is interchangeable with the “knew or should have known” test
which includes a reasonableness component. The statute of limita-
84. Raytheon Missile Sys., ASBCA No. 58011, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,241 at 173,017
(quoting Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317–20 (Fed. Cir. 2011)).
85. See id. Raytheon Missile parenthetically added that they “knew or should have
known” test is “interchangeable” with the “concealed or inherently unknowable” test,
which includes a reasonableness component.” In addressing the Tucker Act statute,
however, the court in Holmes held only that, under the accrual suspension exception,
whether the claimant who has filed a claim more than six years after the occurrence of
the underlying events—that is, more than six years after accrual—“knew or should
have known” of those events notwithstanding concealment or inherent unknowability
is examined under a reasonableness standard. Holmes did not purport to address,
much less decide, whether a claimant reasonably “knew or should have known” of the
events—a discovery standard of accrual—is “interchangeable” with the Tucker Act’s
standard of accrual on the occurrence of the events. At best, Raytheon Missile’s intro-
duction of Tucker Act accrual suspension concepts (“concealment;” “inherently un-
knowable”) to the analysis of the CDA’s discovery rule concepts (“knew or should
have known”) was unnecessary and confusing.
86. Raytheon Company, Space & Airborne Systems, ASCBA No. 57801, 13-1
BCA ¶ 35, 319.
87. Id., citing FAR 33.201; Gray Personnel, Inc., ASBCA No. 54652, 2006 ASBCA
LEXIS 71, 2006-2 BCA P 33,378 at 165, 475–76.
88. Id., citing Raytheon Missile Systems, ASBCA No. 58011, 2013 ASBCA
LEXIS 11, at *8 (28 Jan. 2013).
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tions will not begin to run until the claimant “learns or reasonably
should have learned” of his cause of action.89
Turning to the facts, the Government knew it had a “potential claim”
based on changes in the contractor’s cost accounting more than six
years before presentment. Although Raytheon did not honor its con-
tractual obligation to disclose an estimate of increased Government
costs from the accounting changes, the Government could have ac-
cessed “cost impact” data in the contractor’s possession. Indeed, the
Government made no claim that any facts had been concealed or were
“inherently unknowable.” The ASBCA nevertheless concluded that,
under the “reasonableness standard,” the Government’s claim did not
accrue until the contractor sent it a cost impact estimate.  In short,
Raytheon Space by implication held that neither “concealment” nor
“inherent unknowability” were necessary to determining when a
claimant “reasonably should have learned” of its claim.
Although the tribunals routinely recite the above passage from Ray-
theon Space as the legal standard, Raytheon Space and later cases
neither analyze nor apply a “concealed or inherently unknowable”
test as a predicate to inquiring when the claimant learned or reasona-
bly should have learned of the cause of action.90 The gap between
legal standard and its application, moreover, goes further—the statute
in theory may be triggered when a claimant “reasonably should have
learned” of the claim.  In practice, the tribunals generally have found
claims to accrue only when the claimant has actual possession of the
information that forms the basis of the claim. Thus, a claimant that
“reasonably” could have acquired the facts after being put on “notice”
of a “potential claim” will not trigger the statute of limitations pe-
riod.91 But the claimant’s failure to appreciate the legal significance of
facts it possesses will not delay accrual.92  The cases simply do not
discuss accrual in the language of traditional “discovery rule” analysis,
which considers when a reasonably diligent claimant would have dis-
covered the claim, or when, and under what circumstances, a claim-
ant’s duty to investigate a potential claim may trigger the statute.93
89. Id., citing Holmes v. United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quot-
ing Japanese War Notes Claimants Ass’n of the Philippines, Inc. v. United States, 373
F.2d 356, 359, 178 Ct. Cl. 630 (Ct. Cl. 1967)) (emphasis in original).
90. In a small number of CDA decisions, the BCAs or COFC have purported to
consider “accrual Suspension doctrine” criteria and find that the claimant had
presented no evidence of “concealment” or “inherent unknowability.”  Raytheon Co.
v. United States, 104 Fed. Cl. 327, 331 (2012); Laguna Constr. Co., 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,618
at 174,459. In those cases, however, it was undisputed that the claimants possessed all
information necessary to assert their claims more than six years before presentment.
91. See Gray Personnel, Inc., ASBCA No. 54652, 06-2 BCA ¶ 33,378 at 165,476.
92. In contrast, the Board in Raytheon Space held that the claim did not accrue
until the Government had all the claim facts.
93. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644 (2010).
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2. Is “Should Have Known” an “Objective”
or “Subjective” Inquiry?
The case law is inconsistent on whether and to what extent “actual”
or “subjective” knowledge of ascertainable facts underlying a claim is
necessary for determining that a claim has accrued. The COFC has
ruled that “[w]hether events have occurred to fix a party’s liability ‘is
determined under an objective standard; a [claimant] does not have to
possess actual knowledge of all the relevant facts in order for the
cause of action to accrue’. . . . The question of when a claimant should
know of its claim is a fact-bound inquiry that depends on the reasona-
bleness of the claimant’s actions.”94 Cases from the ASBCA similarly
state an “objective” standard, under which “claim accrual does not
turn upon what a party subjectively understood; it objectively turns
upon what facts are reasonably knowable.”95
On the other hand, as noted, after Sikorsky’s reversal of treating the
statute of limitations as “jurisdictional,” many more limitations dis-
putes are decided on the summary judgment stage. In that context,
several cases have provided that the “‘knew or should have known
test’ includes a reasonableness component regarding ‘what facts were
reasonably knowable to the claimant. Summary judgment is not nor-
mally appropriate where reasonableness and subjective knowledge are
facts at issue.’”96 Applying that criteria, several opinions have denied
summary judgment motions because of unresolved factual issues con-
cerning a claimant’s actual knowledge of facts underlying the claims.97
It does not appear that any cases have held that a CDA claim accrued
94. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 657, 673 (2012).
95. Raytheon Missile Sys., ASBCA No. 58011, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,241, at 173,016;
accord Laguna Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 58569, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,618, at 174,459 (“The
‘should have been known’ test of claim accrual has a reasonableness component - it
turns, objectively, upon what facts were reasonably knowable to the claimant.”).
96. IBM Corp., ABSCA No. 60332, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,002, at 180,192 (quoting Kel-
logg Brown & Root Servs., Inc., ABSCA Nos. 58518, 59005, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,408, at
177,528 (citing Raytheon Co., ABSCA No. 58840, 15-1 BCA ¶ 36,000, at 175,868)).
97. See, e.g., IBM Corp., ABSCA No. 60332, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,002, at 180,191, 93
(denying contractor’s summary judgment motion under statute of limitations in con-
nection with government claim that contractor failed to perform adequate informa-
tion technology services, enabling third party intrusions:  “In order to draw
conclusions about the timing and scope of the government’s knowledge of the network
intrusions, and IBM’s alleged failure to prevent the intrusions, we would need signifi-
cantly more information about the government’s investigations”); Kellogg Brown &
Root Servs., ABSCA No. 58465, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,253, at 176,869–70 (denying motion
for summary judgment on government claim to recover costs paid to contractor for
reimbursement of costs of trucks where contractor failed to show that government
“actually knew or was even aware that the trucks were faulty or non-functional” at
time of payment of contractor’s bills); Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., ABSCA No.
58175, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,988 at 175,591 (denying motion to bar government claim as
untimely where contractor acknowledged that it had not subjectively appreciated its
non-compliance with contract more than six years before presentment).
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at the time a claimant “objectively” “should have known” facts under-
lying the claim that were, in fact unknown to the claimant.
3. Who knew or should have known?
CDA litigation frequently involves multi-year, complex contracts
involving hundreds, if not thousands, of employees from multiple
Government agencies, contractors, subcontractors, and their respec-
tive agents and representatives. In the simplest cases, for example, a
DoD contract will often involve the procuring service or department,
the same or a separate contract administration agency, a separate pay-
ment office, and Government contract auditors. A large contractor’s
performance may likewise involve the participation of personnel per-
forming a wide variety of tasks from numerous business departments
and offices.
Under the discovery-type definition of “accrual” in FAR 31.201,
there are different approaches to determining how—and therefore
when—an entity-claimant “knows or should have known” of its claim.
At one extreme, an entity could be deemed to “know” all information
in its collective possession, no matter how compartmentalized or frag-
mented. At the other extreme, information showing the existence of a
claim may not be imputable to an organization unless all that informa-
tion is known by single, authorized, natural person. A rule of imputa-
tion falling anywhere between these two poles raises complications.
In deciding whether a statute of limitations for securities fraud en-
forcement actions should “accrue” when the violation occurs or when
it is ‘discovered,” for example, the Supreme Court remarked on the
difficulties presented by imputation under a “discovery” rule:
Determining when the Government, as opposed to an individual,
knew or reasonably should have known of a fraud presents particu-
lar challenges for the courts. Agencies often have hundreds of em-
ployees, dozens of offices, and several levels of leadership. In such a
case, when does “the Government” know of a violation? Who is the
relevant actor? Different agencies often have overlapping responsi-
bilities; is the knowledge of one attributed to all?98
Despite the complex nature of the parties and their relationships in
many CDA disputes, the imputation of knowledge relevant to an en-
tity’s potential claims appears to have been expressly addressed in
only one case. In Raytheon Missiles, a Government contract adminis-
tration “cost and pricing” analyst in 1999 approved the proposed pric-
ing of a contract, unaware that the terms did not conform to a recent
disclosed change in the contractor’s accounting practices, which would
have resulted in costs lower to the Government than presented in the
proposed contract.  More than six years later, the same analyst, who
by then was aware of the change in accounting practice, reexamined
98. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 452 (2013).
86 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
the contract and determined that the contractor overcharged the Gov-
ernment. The ASBCA found that the Government’s subsequent claim
was time-barred, rejecting the argument that only the knowledge of
the authorized contracting officer could be imputed to the
Government:
The Government fails to cite any authority . . . that claim accrual is
based only upon the knowledge of the individual clothed by a con-
tracting party with authority to assert the claim.  If that were the
case, then both contractors and the Government could suspend ac-
crual by internally compartmentalizing relevant information and in-
sulating senior decision makers from it for as long as they choose.
Nothing in FAR 33.201 [accrual definition] contemplates permitting
such gamesmanship. Claim accrual is not suspended simply because
the Government may have been delayed . . . in funneling to the
individual authorized to act upon the claim all of the information
relevant to it.99
Raytheon Missiles leaves many questions unanswered, including
those suggested in Gabelli. The decision does not hold that unassimi-
lated knowledge of entity personnel will be imputed for purposes of
accrual. Nor does it imply that claim facts may be imputed even if no
single natural person agent “knew or should have known” of all the
information.100  Consistent with the common law, the usual rules of
agency should apply in determining when a cause of action accrues
under a “discovery” rule. For example, in a case against a Govern-
ment agency under the Administrative Procedures Act, the district
court observed:
For purposes of determining a principal’s legal relations with a third
party, notice of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to know is
imputed to the principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the
agent’s duties to the principal. . . . Though not as often invoked for
purposes of applying a statute of limitations as for other legal rela-
tions such as liabilities, the rule is generally applicable. Veal v. Ger-
aci, 23 F.3d 722, 725 (2nd Cir. 1994) (internal citations omitted). . . .
Furthermore, this principle applies outside the context of corporate
99. Raytheon Missile Sys., ASBCA No. 58011, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,241, at 173,016– 17.
(The Board’s “host of horribles” is not a persuasive reason for rejecting the govern-
ment’s argument. It is unlikely that any organization would design a system of inter-
nal communication to conceal information material to contract performance or issues
from decision makers for the sake of extending the amount of time to present claims
for hypothetical causes of action that may arise under any contract. On the contrary,
it is more likely that a party, aware that it had violated the other’s rights under the
contract in some way, may selectively disclose bits and pieces of the material informa-
tion to different persons, elements, or functions of the other party to obscure recogni-
tion, or timely recognition, of a redressable harm.).
100. In Raytheon Missiles, a single Government agent, the pricing analysis, charged
with evaluating the pricing of the proposed contract, arguably should have known all
circumstances material to that assessment, including the contractor’s current account-
ing practices.
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or business law, and may be applied to Government entities that act
through agents.101
4. Is Knowability of a “Sum Certain” Required?
As discussed above, the CDA tribunals, without analysis, give two
meanings to “claim” in the CDA limitations provision that “[e]ach
claim . . . shall be submitted within [six] years after the accrual of the
claim.” The first reference to “claim” in “each claim . . . shall be sub-
mitted” means the technical CDA “claim” defined in section 2.101 of
FAR, the “submittal” of which is necessary to stop the limitations
clock and ensure jurisdiction in the CDA forums. On the other hand,
the second reference to “claim” in “after the accrual of the claim” is
synonymous with “cause of action.” For the reasons discussed above,
it is incongruous to speak of “accrual” of a “claim” as defined by sec-
tion 2.101 of FAR. In a 2016 decision, however, the Federal Circuit
purported to do precisely that.102
In Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, the prime Gov-
ernment contractor, appellant Kellogg Brown & Root (“KBR”), ter-
minated a subcontract for certain services in July 2003. The
subcontractors sued KBR in 2004 for moneys due and termination
costs. In January 2005, KBR in a settlement committed to pay the
subcontractors’ costs and invoice the Government. For the next seven
years, however, KBR and the subcontractors disputed the amount
due. On May 2, 2012, KBR submitted a certified claim to the Govern-
ment in the amount it finally agreed to pay the subcontractors. The
Government’s final decision rejected KBR’s claim as time-barred. On
appeal to the ASBCA, KBR contended that its claim did not “accrue”
until, at the earliest, November 2006 (within the six-year period) when
the subcontractors first sent a specific “claim” amount. The Board re-
jected this argument, holding that KBR’s claim accrued when it termi-
nated the subcontract in 2003. At the latest, the claim accrued when
KBR executed the January 2005 settlement agreement, obligating it to
pay the subcontractors’ costs, even though the amount had not been
determined. Consistent with prior precedent, the ASBCA held:
Claim accrual does not depend on the degree of detail provided,
whether the contractor revises the calculations later, or whether the
contractor characterizes the impact as ‘immaterial.’ It is enough that
the Government [or contractor] knows, or has reason to know, that
some costs have been incurred, even if the amount is not finalized
or a fuller analysis will follow.103
101. Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate of the Lake Traverse Reservation v. U.S. Corps of
Eng’rs, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130732, at *22-23 (D.S.D. Sept. 18, 2014).
102. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, 823 F.3d 622, 627 (Fed. Cir.
2016).
103. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., ASBCA No. 58492, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,713, at
174,866 (citation omitted).
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It also disagreed that KBR’s claim could not have accrued until No-
vember 2006, on receipt of the subcontractors’ specific demand:
We reject this approach chiefly because it makes accrual dependent
upon KBR’s diligence in organizing and submitting its claim. As
such, it runs headlong into our holding in Raytheon Missile Sys-
tems,104 holding that “[a]ccrual of a contracting party’s claim is not
suspended until it performs an audit or other financial analysis to
determine the amount of its damages.” We relied upon the principle
. . . that “a single party [cannot] postpone unilaterally and indefi-
nitely the running of the statute of limitations.”105
On KBR’s appeal, the Federal Circuit Court reversed, ruling that
“[f]ixing the date of accrual of a claim requires first that there is a
‘claim’ as defined in the Contract Disputes Act and the associated
Regulations.” It then stated that “a “‘claim’ for ‘the payment of
money’ does not ‘accrue’ until the amount of the claim, ‘a sum certain’
. . . is ‘known or should have been known.’”106 The court reasoned
that, although KBR knew it had unspecified monetary liability for
more than six years before presentment, its reimbursement “claim”
against the Government could not have accrued until the subcontrac-
tors presented a “claim” amount to KBR (less than six years before).
The court concluded that “[a]ccrual in accordance with [Section
33.201 of the] FAR does not occur until KBR requests, or reasonably
could have requested, a sum certain from the Government.”
On its face, Kellogg unambiguously held that a claim does not ac-
crue until the claimant asserts, or reasonably could assert, a “sum cer-
tain,” which cannot happen until that sum certain is “known or should
have been known.” The decision would appear to overrule well-estab-
lished precedent in the BCAs and the COFC that, for a claim to ac-
crue, “some extra costs must have been incurred . . . but there is no
requirement that a sum certain be established.”107 Whether the Kellogg
104. Appeal of Raytheon Missile Systems, ASBCA No. 58011, 13 BCA ¶ 35,241 at
173,018.
105. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., ASBCA No. 58492, 14-1 B.C.A ¶ 35,713.
106. (citing FAR 2.101; 33.201).
107. McDonnell Douglas Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 56568, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,325
(emphasized added). Accord, Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl.
657, 672 (2012) (quoting and following McDonnell Douglas); Kellogg Brown & Root
Servs., ASBCA No. 58175, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,713 (“although the claim accrual definition
contemplates the possibility of non-monetary injury, when monetary damages are al-
leged, some extra costs must have been incurred before liability can be fixed and a
claim accrues, but there is no requirement that a sum certain be established”);  See
also Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 58660, 15-1 BCA ¶  35,828 (“when monetary damages
are alleged, some extra costs must have been incurred before liability can be fixed and
a claim accrued, but there is no requirement that a sum certain be established”). See
also R.R. Gregory Corp., ASBCA No. 58517, 14-1 BCA ¶ 35,524 (“Accrual of a con-
tracting party’s claim is not suspended until it performs an audit or other financial
analysis to determine the amount of its damages. ‘[A] single party [cannot] postpone
unilaterally and indefinitely the running of the statute of limitations.’ United States v.
Commodities Export Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Raytheon, 104 Fed. Cl.
2019] THE CONTRACT DISPUTE ACT’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 89
decision will command respect is another matter.108
5. The Practical Unavailability of “Equitable Tolling”
Under the “equitable tolling” doctrine, a CDA claimant may avoid
dismissal of an otherwise untimely claim under “equitable tolling.” As
a practical matter, however, the circumstances in which this doctrine
may be invoked are scarce. Equitable tolling of a statute of limitations
requires a litigant to establish two elements: “(1) that [the claimant]
has been pursuing his [or her] rights diligently, and (2) that some ex-
traordinary circumstance stood in his [or her] way and prevented
timely filing.”109 To meet the “extraordinary circumstance” element,
the claimant must show that an “external obstacle” “stood in his way
and prevented timely filing.”110  The “mere excusable neglect is not
enough to establish a basis for equitable tolling; there must be a com-
pelling justification for delay, such as ‘where the complainant has been
induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the fil-
ing deadline to pass.’”111
In Khenj Logistics Group, the contractor (“KLG”) procured re-
quired materials for the contract project and delivered them to the
work site shortly before the Government issued a stop-work order.
The Government later terminated the contract for convenience. In
June 2009, the contracting officer promised KLG that it would reim-
burse KLG on its invoice for the materials cost. Although the Govern-
ment paid an invoice for a separate item in October 2009, it did not
pay the materials invoice. The Board held that because KLG should
have known that the Government would not honor its promise to pay
the materials invoice at the time it paid for the separate item, KLG’s
claim accrued in October 2009. KLG did not submit a CDA claim for
the unpaid materials costs until March 2017. The Board held that eq-
uitable tolling did not save KLG’s claim, dismissing its claim because
the “delay in submitting its claim is ‘a garden variety claim of excusa-
ble neglect’ for which equitable tolling provides no relief”:
at 330-3.  Damages need not have actually been calculated for a claim to accrue. See
CACI Int’l, Inc., ASBCA No. 57559, 12-1 BCA ¶ 35,027 at 172,138–9. The fact of an
injury must simply be knowable.”).
108. In Crane & Co., Inc. v. Dept. of the Treasury, CBCA 4965, 16-1 BCA ¶ 36,539.
The CBCA rejected the argument that, under Kellogg, a contractor’s claim could not
accrue until it had incurred all damages arising from the Government’s alleged
breach. Citing Gray, the CBCA stated that for “a claim to accrue, the contractor
‘must [only] have begun actual performance and incurred some extra costs for liability
to be fixed,’ and the completion of a change or of the contract [is] not necessary in
order for liability to be fixed.”  It ruled that Kellogg’s “sum certain” holding did not
require any different result.  It is unclear from that decision whether the CBCA dis-
missed any part of the contractor’s claim for damages accruing within the six-year
period.
109. Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 750, 755 (2016).
110. Id. at 752.
111. Al-Juthoor Contr. Co. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 599, 615 (2016).
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KLG does not identify any action it took to pursue its claim be-
tween October 2009 and March 2017. Nor does it identify a circum-
stance that impaired its ability to submit a claim. Notwithstanding
KLG’s unsuccessful attempts in June 2009, there was nothing
preventing further contact with Army contracting officials to submit
its claim, as confirmed by its successful submission in March 2017.
Thus, it is unable to demonstrate either element of equitable tolling.
B. Application of “Accrual” to Claim Types
This Section summarizes how the CDA forums have applied the
CDA statute of limitations in more significant and recurrent cases
brought by the Government and contractors.
1. Government Claims
a. Claims for Unallowable Indirect Costs
In a majority of cases litigated under the CDA, contractors are paid
as contracts are performed throughout the year, often on a semi-
weekly basis. Typically, contractors prepare “public vouchers,” which
will include detailed invoices and schedules to break out the types of
costs (such as labor, materials, and subcontractor costs) and submit
them for payment to the appropriate paying office or agency. In gen-
eral, under typical “cost-type” contracts, contractors bill for “direct
costs” incurred for goods and services specifically required by the con-
tract. The Government also pays contractors “indirect costs,” such as
overhead; general and administrative expenses; “fringe” benefits paid
to employees; and independent research and development costs.  A
contract will also provide for payment of some amount of profit (or
“fee”) for the contractor’s work.
Reimbursable direct and indirect costs are subject to a variety of
contractual requirements.  In general, a contractor is entitled to pay-
ment of reasonable costs, for work authorized by the contract, that the
contractor actually incurred and paid, and that complied with limita-
tions under “cost principles” set forth in Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions. For interim billing, indirect costs typically are determined by
provisional rates agreed on by the parties in advance.  Within six
months after the end of the year, contractors must submit a lengthy,
detailed summary of costs in an “incurred cost” or “indirect rate” pro-
posals (“cost proposals”), which are subject to audit by Government
auditors, such as the Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCAA”).
“Cost proposals” enable the contractor and Government to “true up”
actual and reimbursable costs, indirect cost rates, and fee for the com-
pleted year.
With the explosion in military spending and defense contracts in the
2000s, contractors began to file enormous and unprecedented volumes
of annual cost proposals. Accordingly, the DCAA faced significant
challenges in auditing a growing backlog of annual submissions.  As a
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result, it often took years to audit annual submissions for unallowable
costs, creating challenges for contracting officers to determine within
six years of the cost submissions whether the Government was enti-
tled to reimbursement or penalties from contractors. These circum-
stances contributed significantly to the marked increased in statutes of
limitations disputes.
Over the past several years, contractors routinely have argued that
Government claims asserted more than six years after receipt of the
relevant cost submissions are time-barred, Contractors contended that
Government claims accrued, at the latest, on Government receipt of
the cost proposals. In some cases, contractors have gone farther, main-
taining that the Government knew or should have known that a cost
proposal would include unallowable costs based on prior year’s sub-
missions that included similarly unallowable costs. In a series of deci-
sions, however, the ASBCA generally rejected these arguments. As
the Board explained in Technology Systems,112 a Government claim
for unallowable indirect costs cannot possibly “accrue” before receipt
of the cost proposal:
[It is] legally impossible for the Government to issue its [contracting
officer’s final decision or “COFD” for unallowable indirect costs]
before submission of the ICP [incurred cost proposal], because the
legal bases for establishing the indirect costs . . . presuppose[s] ac-
tion upon a “final” ICP submitted by the contractor. Since no
COFD approving or disapproving portions of the . . . ICP [can be]
issued until after submission of said proposal . . . and the ability to
assert such a claim is a prerequisite to claim accrual . . . it is impossi-
ble for the statute to have begun to run . . . prior to submission of
[the] ICP.
Under the “knew or should have known” test, moreover, the Board
has also rejected the argument that Government claims accrue on re-
ceipt of the cost proposals. Instead, the decisions have been fairly con-
sistent that, unless the proposal itself discloses information revealing
that a cost is improper, a “[c]laim does not ‘accrue’ . . . until there is
sufficient supporting data to establish [the] Government[‘s] knowl-
edge of the claim.”113 Cost proposals generally do not include any
112. ASBCA No. 59577, 2017-1 BCA ¶ 36,631 at 178,388–89.
113. See id. at 178,399 (Clark, A.L.J., dissenting in part on other grounds) (citing
Combat Support Associates, ASBCA Nos. 58945, 58946, 2014-1 BCA ¶ 35,782, at
175,041–42, vacated on other grounds, 2015-1 BCA ¶ 35,923 (Government claim for
direct costs included in cost proposal did not accrue until auditor received the “sup-
porting data related to those costs” less than six years before the final decision. “[T]he
government . . . knew or had reason to know of its claims only . . . upon appellant’s
submission of the ‘supporting data’ from which the government learned, or had rea-
son to learn, of its claims.”).). See also, e.g., Coherent Logix, Inc., ASBCA No. 59725,
2015-1 BCA ¶ 35,497, at 175,679 (no precedential value pursuant to Board Rule 12.2)
(Claim filed more than six years after receipt of ICP was timely as “there is nothing
. . . to indicate that [unallowability of legal fees] would have been apparent to the
government from a review of the submitted [ICP], which simply listed ‘Legal Fees.’”).
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breakout of individualized indirect costs or underlying documentation
needed to determine whether the claimed costs are allowable. Thus, a
Government claim ordinarily will not accrue until the time when, dur-
ing an audit or other review of the cost proposal, the Government
obtains information (usually from the contractor itself) that reveals
the “unallowability” of the costs. This may often be months or even
years after receipt of the cost proposal.114
The CDA tribunals have not yet examined when the Government,
in the exercise of due diligence after receipt of a cost proposal,
“should have known” that indirect costs were unallowable. In several
cases, there has been considerable delay between receipt of a cost pro-
posal and subsequent audit or other work to determine the allowabil-
ity of the contractor’s claimed costs.115 The decisions leave an
arguable impression that the Government may indefinitely delay ef-
forts to assess the accuracy of a cost proposal without any effect on
the accrual of any subsequently filed claims.
b. Claims to recoup payment for direct costs
The Boards of Contract Appeals have issued conflicting decisions
on the accrual date for Government claims to recover payments for
direct contract costs that the Government asserts it should not have
been billed. In Sparton DeLeon Springs, LLC,116 the Government
paid a contractor’s vouchers for direct labor costs incurred by a sub-
sidiary during 2007. The payment vouchers included line-item detail
for the costs, but it did attach primary source documents, such as labor
time cards, to substantiate the costs. More than seven years later, the
contracting officer filed a claim to recover the labor costs, alleging
that the contractor had failed to provide supporting documents to
show that the costs had actually been incurred or paid despite several
recent Government requests. The ASBCA granted the contractor’s
summary judgment motion, ruling that the Government’s claim ac-
crued at the time it paid the vouchers, which was more than six years
earlier. “If it is the case that the interim vouchers lacked support such
114. See, e.g., Combat Support Assoc., 2014-1 BCA ¶ 35,782 at 175,041 (Denying
dismissal of government claim where DCAA auditor testified without rebuttal “infor-
mation it needed to know that it had the claims set forth” in 2013 final decisions was
not received until several months after May 2007 cost proposal.”); Alion Science and
Technology Corp., ASBCA No. 58922, 2015-1 BCA ¶ 36,168 at 176,490–91 (COFD
issued 7.5 years after receipt of ICP not untimely; ICP did not include the underlying
detail until 20 months after cost proposal, which showed “specific nature of the costs,”
that enabled Government “to identify the [costs] at issue as expressly unallowable.”).
115. See, e.g., Combat Support Assoc., 2014-1 BCA ¶ 35,782 at 175,041 (more than
six years between cost proposal submission and DCAA audit report on unallowable
costs); Coherent Logix, Inc., ASBCA No. 59725, 2015-1 BCA ¶ 35,497, at 175,679
(DCAA auditors did not request documents revealing unallowability of costs until
five years after cost proposal).
116. ASBCA No. 60416, 17-1 B.C.A. ¶ 36,601, reh’g denied, ASBCA No. 60416, 17-
1 B.C.A. ¶ 36,764.
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as certified time cards, the government knew or should have known
that no later than 10 January 2007, by when it paid those interim
vouchers,” it held.
The holding in Sparton DeLeon casted doubt upon prior ASBCA
decisions, which held that a Government claim to recover payment for
direct costs did not accrue on payment of the invoices alone.117 In
DRS Global Enterprise Solutions, Inc., however, a different ASBCA
judge forcefully revived the earlier precedent. As in Spartan, the Gov-
ernment in DRS asserted a claim based on the contractor’s failure to
support direct costs that the Government paid more than six years
before the claim. The ASBCA dismissed the appellant’s argument,
based on Sparton DeLeon, for a “blanket rule that the statute begins
to run when the government pays the invoice.”118  The contractor fur-
ther argued that the claim accrued upon payment because “whether
certain costs were substantiated or not involves objective facts that are
reasonably knowable.”  The ASBCA rejected this argument as well,
finding that the appellant adduced no evidence that the Government
“knew” or was “aware” of the lack of supporting documents at the
time of payment.
By denying any “blanket rule” stating that a Government claim to
recoup payment of unallowable direct costs must be brought within
six years of payment, DRS affirmed that, under the “knew or should
have known” accrual standard, “when [a claimant] reasonably should
have known of its claim requires consideration of the unique facts in
[the particular] appeal.”119 At the same time, the decision illustrates
the propensity of the CDA tribunals to focus on actual knowledge or
awareness as the trigger instead of the availability of “objective facts
that are reasonably knowable.”
In a decision reached just a few weeks before DRS, by the Civilian
Board of Contract Appeals arguably hewed more closely to a “discov-
ery type” inquiry in a case involving a Government claim for overpay-
ment of direct costs. In United Liquid Gas Company d/b/a United
Pacific Energy v. General Services Agency,120 the General Services
Administrations (“GSA”) awarded United Pacific Energy a “multi
award schedule contract” to provide propane gas to the procuring
agency, a DoD facility (Ft. Irwin), for $1.32 a gallon. Under the con-
tract, a GSA contracting officer was responsible for contract adminis-
tration and monitoring. For reasons unexplained in the opinion, Ft.
Irwin subsequently issued task orders to procure gas at $1.44 per gal-
lon. The DoD-paying agency, the Defense Finance and Accounting
117. See, e.g., Appeal of Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 58465,
2016-1 BCA ¶ 36,253.
118. ASBCA No. 61368, 2018 ASBCA LEXIS 255 *8 (Aug. 30, 2018).
119. Id.
120. United Liquid Gas Co. v. Gen. Servs. Admin., CBCA No. 5846, slip op. (July
12, 2018).
94 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
Service (“DFAS”), received and paid invoices that charged $1.44 per
gallon amount in January 2011. More than six years later, GSA filed a
claim that sought to recover amounts paid in excess of the $1.32 con-
tract amount.  The CBCA held that the Government claim accrued,
and the statute began to run, when DFAS began to pay UPE’s in-
voices in January 2011. As a result, the statute cut off the claim to the
extent that it sought recovery of the excess amount paid more than six
year before the Government filed the claim. The CBCA concluded:
GSA’s argument that the invoices were submitted and paid by
DFAS, as opposed to GSA’s finance office, is . . . unavailing. Al-
though Ft. Irwin ordered [and] received . . . the propane gas orders
[and] DFAS paid the invoices, GSA was obligated to monitor those
payments in its role as the administrator of the [contract]. Had GSA
been properly monitoring the . . . contract, it would have realized
that there were problems with overbillings as they occurred.121
While consistent with a discovery rule analysis, DRS’s conclusion
that the Government should have known the facts is potentially signif-
icant, adverse authority for the Government. The opinion gives no in-
dication that GSA itself was aware of or in possession of information
that the contractor had overbilled under the contract. Instead, GSA’s
failure to perform its contractual duty to “monitor” invoices to and
payments by a separate paying agency was enough to meet the
“should have known” test. A broader recognition of “accrual” based
on contract administrative duties to “monitor” payments by a separate
payment agency such as DFAS, which handles in excess of 13 million
in DoD contract payments annually,122 may pose risks to the Govern-
ment in timely recognizing and asserting claims to recover payments
of unallowable or improper direct costs.123
c. “Accounting change” claims
In negotiating prices for “cost plus” and fixed price contracts, the
Government may rely on the contractor’s disclosed accounting prac-
tices to determine how it accumulates, estimates, and records costs. In
general, under the Government’s Cost Accounting Standards
(“CAS”) accounting practices should remain “consistent.”124 In the
121. Id. at 7.
122. See DEF. FIN. & ACCT. SERV., https://www.dfas.mil/pressroom/aboutdfas.html
[https://perma.cc/WGU3-KREH] (last visited Jan. 6, 2019).
123. Notably, the basis for the DRS decision permitted the CBCA to avoid address-
ing the problematic question whether distinct knowledge of different agencies, none
of which alone have all facts necessary to show a claim, may nevertheless be deemed
collective knowledge of the “Government” for determining when a claim accrues.
124. “The CAS encompasses a series of accounting standards intended to achieve
uniformity and consistency in measuring, assigning, and allocating costs to contracts
with the federal government.”  Rice v. Martin Marietta Corp., 13 F.3d 1563, 1565
(Fed. Cir. 1993). “The cost accounting standards (CAS) consist of nineteen standards
promulgated by the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB) designed to ensure
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event a contractor wishes to change an accounting practice, it must
disclose the change to the Government within prescribed periods of
time in advance of the effective date of the change. In addition, upon
request by the contracting officer, the contractor must disclose any
cost increase or “impact” the change will have on applicable contracts
in effect at the time of the change.125  In an accounting change cost
impact claim, the Government seeks a type of “benefit of the bargain”
damages by being placed in the same position it would have been in
had the contractor not made the accounting change.126
In general, the CDA forums have held that a Government claim for
a cost impact resulting from an accounting change accrues on the date
that the Government is provided with notice of the change, a state-
ment of adverse cost impact, and at least some costs have been in-
curred.127  Determining when a Government accounting change cost
impact claim “accrues” can be a complicated undertaking.  For exam-
ple, in Raytheon Missile Sys., the Government asserted a claim for
increased costs caused by the contractor’s accounting practice change
more than six years after the effective date of the disclosed change
and after the contractor gave the Government a statement of a “cost
impact” it described as “immaterial.” The Government’s claim ulti-
mately asserted a cost impact more than two orders of magnitude
greater than the contractor’s disclosed “immaterial” amounts.128 The
Government argued that the contractor’s “cost impact” “did not sub-
mit the level of information and supporting data required by” the cost
impact regulation (which ordinarily requires a “General Dollar Mag-
nitude,” or “GDM,” impact estimate) and, therefore, could not have
triggered the statute. Although earlier acknowledging that the con-
tractor had a contractual obligation to submit a GDM, the Board re-
jected the Government’s argument and dismissed its claim as time
barred:
Raytheon did notify the Government of a dollar cost impact from
the accounting change, which is enough to trigger the statute of lim-
itations. Claim accrual does not depend on the degree of detail pro-
vided, whether the contractor revises the calculations later, or
whether the contractor characterizes the impact as “immaterial.” It
is enough that the Government knows, or has reason to know, that
uniformity and consistency in the measurement, assignment and allocation of costs to
contracts with the United States Government. CAS covers a variety of costs such as
depreciation, pension plans, personal compensation, indirect costs and other areas of
cost accounting.” Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), DEF. ACQUISITION U., https://
www.dau.mil/acquipedia/Pages/ArticleDetails.aspx?aid=8cc390ac-fe08-4198-aa4d-3e3
f261d74e8 [https://perma.cc/E6R5-43YG] (last visited Aug. 20, 2018).
125. See FAR 30.602 (2017).
126. Cf. CI2, Inc., ASBCA No. 59948, 2016-1 BCA ¶36,410 at 177,533 (discussing
basic measures for breach of contract).
127. Raytheon Co., Space & Airborne Sys., ASBCA Nos. 57801 et al., 13-1 BCA ¶
35,319 at 173,376; The Boeing Co., ASBCA No. 57490, 12-1 BCA ¶ 34,916.
128. Raytheon Missile Sys., ASBCA No. 58,011, 2013-1 BCA ¶ 35,241 at 173,018.
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some costs have been incurred, even if the amount is not finalized
or a fuller analysis will follow.129
The Board’s conclusion that it was “enough that the Government
knows, or has reason to know, that some costs have been incurred” is
a mantra routinely recited as part of the interpretation of the accrual
standard. That position, however, is in tension with the Federal Cir-
cuit’s holding in Kellogg Brown that “a ‘claim’ for ‘the payment of
money’ does not ‘accrue’ until the amount of the claim, ‘a sum cer-
tain,’ is ‘known or should have been known.’130”131 To date, no deci-
sions have addressed the impact of Kellogg Brown on the lower
forums’ interpretations.
d. Noncompliance with Cost Accounting Standards
In Government claims for violations of CAS standards, the CDA
forums generally have applied Gray’s “continuing claims” doctrine,
under which “portions of the claim within the statutory limitation pe-
riod can survive although the statute of limitations has lapsed for ear-
lier events.”132 In Appeal of Fluor Corp., the Government in 2004
learned that the contractor (Fluor) had misallocated “home office
costs” in violation of a CAS standard.133  In November 2011, the con-
tracting officer issued a final decision, asserting a Government claim
for increased costs of $63 million resulting from the CAS noncompli-
ance over the years 2004 through 2010.  On appeal, the contractor ar-
gued that the Government’s entire claim accrued on January 1, 2004,
the date that the COFD asserted as the start date of Fluor’s noncom-
pliance, and was therefore time-barred. Invoking the “continuing
claims” doctrine, the Board rejected Fluor’s argument:
[T]he Government did not and could not know at that time, much
less submit a CDA claim for, the increased cost of those practices to
the Government work over the next seven years until that work was
performed, billed and paid. . . . The Government’s 17 November
2011 claim was a continuing claim inherently susceptible to being
broken down into a series of independent distinct events each hav-
ing its own associated damages-namely, each payment by the Gov-
ernment to Fluor for a CAS non-compliant billing on a Government
contract. . . . [W]e find that the Government’s 17 November 2011
CDA claim was a continuing claim in which each payment by the
Government of the increased cost in an alleged CAS non-compliant
129. Raytheon Missile Sys., ASBCA No. 58,011, 2013-1 BCA ¶ 35,241 at 173,017
(“Damages need not have actually been calculated for a claim to accrue . . . The fact
of an injury must simply be knowable”).
130. (citing FAR 2.101; 33.201).
131. Kellogg Brown & Root Services, Inc. v. Murphy, 823 F.3d 622, 627 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (citing FAR 2.101, 33.201).
132. ASFA Int’l Constr. Indus. & Trade, Inc., ASBCA No. 57880, 2014-1 BCA ¶
35,736 at 174,911.
133. ASBCA No. 57852, 2014-1 BCA ¶ 35,472.
2019] THE CONTRACT DISPUTE ACT’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 97
billing for Government work was an independent and distinct event
having its own associated damages.
Accordingly, the Board held that the claim for increased costs result-
ing from the noncompliance paid more than six years before the final
decision was time-barred, but that the claim for increased costs paid
within the six-year period could proceed.
2. Contractor Claims
a. Constructive changes
In a claim for increased costs resulting from a “constructive
change,” a contractor must establish that an authorized contracting
officer compelled the contractor to perform work not required by the
contract, resulting in increased costs of performance.134 In general, a
claim for a constructive change cannot accrue at least “until the Gov-
ernment enlarges the contractor’s performance duties.” In line with
Gray, however, accrual will not be delayed until the contract is com-
plete or the contractor has a tally of all costs it has incurred as a result
of the change.
In Robinson Quality Constructors,135 the contractor claimed that,
immediately after commencing performance to renovate an Air Na-
tional Guard facility, it uncovered undisclosed site conditions that re-
quired additional remediation, and encountered numerous other
delays and disruptions it attributed to the Government. The contrac-
tor completed performance on June 1, 1999.  On June 2, 2005, six
years and one day after contract completion, the contractor submitted
a claim for alleged additional costs. In its appeal from a final decision
denying the claim, the contractor argued that it could not have known
whether and what to extent it had incurred additional costs until after
it completed the work. Among other things, it asserted that in per-
forming a long-term construction contract under multiple change or-
ders, it was not feasible for contractors to determine a reliable
estimate of its increased costs immediately on completion.
The Board dismissed the appeal as untimely, rejecting “the sugges-
tion that the rules relating to application of the six-year statute of limi-
tations should depend on the subject matter of the contract or the
complexity of the facts.” The Board stated:
Robinson argues that until the facts of its damages “could actually
be developed,” “the extent of costs incurred could not have been
known until after completion of its work on the Project” (finding
46). We rejected this argument in Gray Personnel, and said for a
claim to accrue, the contractor “must have actually begun perform-
ance and incurred some extra costs for liability to be fixed,” and the
134. Hanley Indus., ASBCA No. 58198, 2014-1 BCA ¶ 35,500 at 174,016.
135. ASBCA No. 55784, 2009-1 BCA ¶ 34,048.
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completion of a change or of the contract was not necessary in order
for liability to be fixed.
It further dismissed the contractor’s alternative argument that the
Government breached the contract within the six-year period by de-
nying the contractor’s claim to “equitably adjust the contract,” refer-
ring to its certified claim. The Board ruled that the “plain language”
of the CDA and the FAR’s “accrual” definition did not support the
proposition that a “claim does not accrue until the [contracting of-
ficer] decides a contractor’s claim.”
b. Requests for equitable adjustment
Contractors may make a “request for an equitable adjustment”
(“REA”) for costs incurred above contract requirements in connec-
tion with constructive changes, changes due to unforeseen circum-
stances, extra costs incurred as a result of flaws in the Government’s
statement of work, and other reasons. An REA is often a useful start-
ing point for negotiating a contract adjustment with the Government.
For the purposes of the CDA’s statute of limitations, however, an
REA confers no benefit for the contractor.
A typical REA is not a CDA claim. As its name implies, it is a
request for an adjustment and will often solicit a negotiation with the
Government over the amount of increased costs. An REA usually (1)
will lack a “demand . . . seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of
money”; (2) will not demand or request a “final decision” from the
contracting officer; (3) may run afoul of the “sum certain” require-
ments by using “estimate,” approximate,” “at least,” or the like; (4)
and may lack the certification required by the CDA and the FAR
“claim” definition. A REA will not stop the statute of limitations from
running.136 On the other hand, an REA submitted more than six years
before presentment of a valid CDA “claim” concerning the same cir-
cumstances, is evidence that the claim is untimely.137
c. Termination for convenience claims
The Government typically has the right to terminate a contract for
“convenience” by written notice. The regulations generally grant the
contractor the right to reimbursement for unpaid, allowable costs in-
curred prior to termination, allocable indirect costs, costs caused by
136. See, e.g., Certified Constr. Co. of Kentucky, LLC, ASBCA No. 58782, 2014-1
B.C.A. ¶ 35,662.
137. See TMS Envirocon, Inc., ASBCA No. 57286, 2012-2 B.C.A. ¶ 35,08. A con-
tractor may convert a REA into an appealable claim by a subsequent writing that,
together with the REA, meets the “claim” requirements. An oral request to convert a
REA to a “claim” will not suffice. H2L1-CSC, JV, ASBCA No. 61404, 2018-1 B.C.A
¶ 37,074 (dismissing appeal from final decision denying oral request to convert prior
written REA to claim).
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the termination itself, and reasonable costs incurred in preparing pro-
posals to settle the contract.
With respect to time limits for claim presentment, termination for
convenience claims are unique in two respects. Under the relevant
contract clause, a contractor must submit a certified “final termination
settlement proposal” within one year from the effective date of the
termination. On written request within the one-year period, the con-
tracting officer may extend the period. The contracting officer, in his
or her discretion, may also accept and act on a proposal received after
one year.  When the contractor submits a late proposal, or none at all,
“the Contracting Officer may determine, on the basis of information
available, the amount, if any, due the Contractor because of the termi-
nation and shall pay the amount determined.”138
Untimely submission of a termination settlement proposal may be
fatal to recovery of any costs to which a contractor may otherwise be
entitled:
The Contractor shall have the right of appeal, under the Disputes
clause, from any determination made by the Contracting Officer
under . . . this clause, except that if the Contractor failed to submit
the termination settlement proposal or request for equitable adjust-
ment within [one year from termination] . . . and failed to request a
time extension, there is no right of appeal.139
Thus, if a contractor submits a proposal after the one-year period, or
submits no proposal at all, an otherwise valid appeal, filed within the
six-year statute of limitations, is nevertheless subject to dismissal for
untimeliness under the one-year clause.140
The contractor’s claim for termination costs accrues only when ne-
gotiation with the Government over a settlement proposal reaches an
“impasse.” Indeed, an “appeal” filed before an “impasse” will be dis-
missed as “premature.”141 When an “impasse” is reached “is an inher-
ently factual question.”  The CDA decisions have been somewhat
opaque in defining “impasse” and “claim” in this context.142  On the
138. FAR 52.249-2 (e) (2017).
139. FAR 52.249-2 (j) (2017).
140. Id. See also Abdul Khabir Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 61155, 18-1 BCA ¶ 37,027.
141. Thorpe See-Op Corp., ASBCA No. 58960, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,833 at 175,246. The
ASBCA has further explained: When a contractor submits a termination for conve-
nience settlement proposal to the Government, the proposal first must ripen into a
claim before we have jurisdiction to review that submission. . . . A termination settle-
ment proposal is not a CDA claim when it is first submitted to the contracting officer
even though it otherwise meets the requirements of the CDA because the proposal is
not submitted to the contracting officer for a final decision. . . . Instead, the proposal
represents an instrument of negotiation. . . . Only after the negotiations reach an
impasse, at a point when the contractor demands a final decision, does the termina-
tion proposal convert to a CDA claim.  Appeal of Cent. Envtl., Inc., ASBCA No.
51086, 98-2 BCA ¶ 29,912, at 148,080.
142. See Cent. Envtl., Inc., ASBCA No. 51086, 98-2 BCA ¶ 29,912 at 148,080.
(“Impasse means deadlock; the point where an objective, reasonable, third-party ob-
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other hand, the parties in termination cost matters have significant
control over claim accrual by deciding whether and when to terminate
“negotiations.”  There do not appear to be any cases holding that a
contractor failed to present a termination for convenience “claim”
within six years after “impasse” and therefore suffered dismissal for
untimely presentment under the statute of limitations.
d. Breach of Payment Clause
Under the “Allowable Cost and Payment Clause” in most Govern-
ment contracts, the “Government will make payments . . . when re-
quested as work progresses, but . . . not more often than . . . every
[two] weeks.”143 In the ordinary course, contractors have every reason
to promptly bill and collect on contracts, and they have little reason to
delay submitting invoices.  On the other hand, Government contracts
typically do not impose any time requirements for contractors to re-
quest payment during performance.
Several CDA decisions have held that a contractor’s claim for pay-
ment does not accrue as work progresses and when goods and services
are delivered, or even at the time the contractor submits an invoice.
Instead, a nonpayment claim will not “accrue” “until [the contractor
has] requested payment [by invoice or other means] and the Govern-
ment [has] rejected the request.”144 The cases reason that, under a
breach of contract theory, “there can be no breach of [the Allowable
Cost and Payment] clause, and therefore no claim accrual from which
the limitation period is measured, until the contractor requests pay-
ment and the Government fails to pay.”145 Under this precept, the
forums have denied Government statute of limitations motions to dis-
miss in cases where the contractors delayed issuing invoices up to ten
years after the right to request payment itself had accrued.146
In holding that a contractor claim for payment does not accrue on
the date that the contractor earned the right to payment, the case law
arguably is not consistent with the accrual standard. A contractor who
performs all work required and has a contractual right to payment on
submission of an invoice would appear to constitute “all events, that
server would conclude that resolution through continued negotiations is unlikely and
continued negotiation is unwarranted.”). See also James M. Ellett Constr. Co. v.
United States, 93 F.3d 1537, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“Consequently, while Ellett’s ter-
mination settlement proposal met the FAR’s definition of a claim, at the time of sub-
mission it was not a claim because it was not submitted to the contracting officer for a
decision”).
143. FAR 52.216-7(a) (1) (2017).
144. Parsons–UXB Joint Venture, ASBCA No. 56481, 2009-2 BCA ¶ 34,305 at 169,
459.
145. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., ASBCA Nos. 55126, 56910, 2011-1 BCA ¶ 34,759
at 171,087.
146. See, e.g., Sys. Mgmt. & Research Techs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, CBCA 4068,
2015-1 BCA ¶35,976 (2014 claim for fixed fees earned from 2004 through 2007 but not
billed until late 2010 not untimely).
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fix the alleged liability of . . . the Government and permit assertion of
the claim.”  Indeed, many Government contracts include a “Prompt
Payment” clause, under which the Government must pay a proper in-
voice within thirty days of receipt, or pay a penalty calculated for the
period from the payment date to the date of actual payment without
regard to any request therefore by the contractor.147 The delayed in-
voice cases also do not mesh with the oft-repeated maxim that a “sin-
gle party [cannot] postpone unilaterally and indefinitely the running
of the statute of limitations.”148 If a contractor has “unilateral” control
over anything, it is the submission of invoices.
The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals recently confronted this
issue in addressing a Government agency motion to dismiss a contrac-
tor claim for payment of work that had gone unbilled for seven to ten
years prior to claim presentment. The Board acknowledged the “un-
tenability” of allowing a contractor to pursue claims for unbilled work
performed in the distant past:
[I]f taken to its extreme, [the] theory—that the limitations period
does not start to run under [the] contract until the contractor sub-
mits an invoice and the Government denies it—would be untenable.
Under its theory, SMARTECH presumably could have waited ten
or twenty years to submit its invoice and, by so doing, deferred ac-
crual of its fixed fee claim. Yet “it cannot be true that one who has a
claim against another which he can perfect and make actionable by
acts within his own power can keep the claim alive indefinitely by
merely refraining from doing those acts.” . . . ‘[W]here a preliminary
step is required before suit is begun, a reasonable time will be
granted therefor but only a reasonable time.’149
Constrained by precedent, the CBCA nevertheless denied the Gov-
ernment agency’s motion to dismiss.
Ironically, when a contractor issues an invoice which goes unpaid,
the date when a claim will be deemed to accrue can be a matter of
uncertainty. In this context, the FAR expressly excludes from the defi-
nition of “claim” any “voucher, invoice, or other routine request for
payment that is not in dispute when submitted.”150 A routine request
for payment will not became a “claim” for purposes of CDA forum
147. See FAR 52.232-25 (2017); see also Pub. Warehousing Co., K.S.C., ASBCA
59020, 2016-1 BCA ¶ 36,366 at 177,270 (“The Prompt Payment Act . . . imposes an
obligation on a government agency to pay an interest penalty when it fails to make a
payment by the required payment date. That interest penalty is calculated for the
period from the day after the required payment date to the date of actual payment,
and is to be paid without regard to whether such an interest penalty was requested.”
148. R.R. Gregory Corp., ASBCA No. 58517, 2014-1 BCA ¶ 35,524 at 174,111
(quoting United States v. Commodities Exp. Co., 972 F.2d 1266, 1271 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
149. Sys. Mgmt. & Research Techs. Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, CBCA 4068, 2015-1
BCA ¶ 35,976, citing Duhame v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 742, 744, 133 Ct. Cl. 360
(Ct. Cl. 1955); Dawnic Steamship Corp. v. United States, 90 Ct. Cl. 537, 579 (1940).
150. FAR 2.101 (2017).
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jurisdiction until the contractor provides “written notice to the con-
tracting officer . . . if [the request] is disputed either as to liability or
amount or is not acted upon in a reasonable time.”151 Under the “rea-
sonable time” language, the tribunals have dismissed as untimely con-
tractor non-payment claims based on invoices that the Government
ignored more than six years after receipt.152  The standard for whether
an amount of time is a “reasonable time” cannot be determined by
any specific criteria, and it will depend on the facts of each case.
VI. CONCLUSION
Increasing litigation about limitations periods are challenging CDA
tribunals to develop coherent and consistent criteria for parties to de-
termine when the six-year period begins to run on their potential
claims. Arguably, the trial judges have made that challenge more diffi-
cult by attempting to impose precedent under the Tucker Act’s non-
discovery-accrual standard on FAR 31.201’s “discovery” rule lan-
guage. That challenge has been compounded by a general tendency of
the BCAs and COFCs to find that claims do not accrue until the
claimant possesses the information on which the claim is based. It is
reasonable to conclude that the decisional law has not matured to the
ideal, and perhaps, idealistic, state of consisting of “rules ensuring fair
and predictable enforcement of statutes of limitations.”153
It may also be observed that, despite the FAR Council’s express
intent and “knew or should have known” definition of “accrual” in
FAR 33.201, the decisional law to date has not developed or applied
typical discovery rule analysis in examining the facts of the cases or in
judgments whether claims are timely or untimely.  With rare excep-
tion, the decisions have not dismissed as untimely claims based on
when a claimant “should have known” or been aware of the relevant
facts where the claimant did not have actual knowledge or possess the
information showing that it had a claim. As a result, the precedent
offers virtually no guidance on issues traditionally fundamental to a
“reasonably should have learned” analysis, which include the
following:
(1) What information is sufficient to put a claimant on “notice”?
(2) Does “notice” itself trigger the period (as Gray suggests), or
does the statute initiate when a diligent claimant discovers the facts,
or reasonably would have discovered the facts?
(3) When and under what circumstances does a claimant have an
affirmative duty to make a reasonable inquiry aimed towards “dis-
covery” of potential claims?
151. Id.
152. Adamant Grp. for Contracting & Gen. Trading, ASBCA No. 60316, 16-1 BCA
¶ 36,577.
153. Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995).
2019] THE CONTRACT DISPUTE ACT’S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 103
(4) When and under what circumstances may a claimant rely on
the other party’s contractual duties to provide information in deter-
mining the nature and extent of any “diligence” expected of the
claimant?
On a more fundamental level, however, the cases have never ad-
dressed whether the FAR’s discovery rule definition of “accrual” ap-
propriately serves as controlling over the definition of the otherwise
undefined term “accrual” in section 7103(4)(a) of the CDA. The FAR
Council undertook to define the word “accrue” in Section 4(a) pursu-
ant to its general authority to promulgate regulations “as may be nec-
essary to implement this Act,”154 and not in response to any specific
delegation. The failure to examine whether the FAR Council’s adop-
tion of its definition of “accrue” is sufficient under the recent Supreme
Court decision relating to proper construction of statutory limitations
provisions and, separately, deference to federal agencies in imple-
menting regulations, raises questions of whether any “discovery rule”
should apply in CDA statute of limitations cases.
In several recent cases, the Supreme Court has sent a strong signal
that the courts should not “graft” a “discovery rule” on the term “ac-
crues” or the like in a federal statute of limitations absent “textual,
historical, or equitable reasons” to do so.155 In Gabelli v. SEC, the
SEC in 2008 filed a civil enforcement action against defendants for
securities law violations between 1999 and 2002 and sought civil pen-
alties, which are subject to a statute of limitations that require an ac-
tion to be brought “within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued.”156 The SEC argued that the statute is subject to a “dis-
covery rule,” delaying accrual until it discovered or “could have been
discovered with reasonable diligence.” The Court rejected that
argument:
154. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, §10002,
108 Stat. 3243.
155. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 454 (2013); see also, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret.
Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2049 (2017) (internal citations omitted) (“Stat-
utes of limitations are designed to encourage plaintiffs ‘to pursue diligent prosecution
of known claims.’ In accord with that objective, limitations periods begin to run ‘when
the cause of action accrues’—that is, ‘when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain re-
lief.”); SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby Prods., 137 S. Ct. 954,
962 (2017) (internal citations omitted) (“First Quality says that the accrual of a claim,
the event that triggers the running of a statute of limitations, occurs when ‘a plaintiff
knows of a cause of action,’ but that is not ordinarily true . . . [a] claim ordinarily
accrues ‘when [a] plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.’ While some
claims are subject to a ‘discovery rule’ under which the limitations period begins when
the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered the injury giving rise to the claim,
that is not a universal feature of statutes of limitations.”); Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.
384, 388 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]t is the standard rule that [accrual
occurs] when the plaintiff has ‘a complete and present cause of action’ that is, when
‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief[.]’”).
156. 568 U.S. at 446–47 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2462).
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“In common parlance a right accrues when it comes into existence
. . . .” . . . Thus the “standard rule” is that a claim accrues “when the
plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” . . . That rule
has governed since the 1830’s when the predecessor to §2462 was
enacted. . . . And that definition appears in dictionaries from the
19th century up until today. See, e.g., 1 A. Burrill, A Law Diction-
ary and Glossary 17 (1850) (“an action accrues when the plaintiff
has a right to commence it”); Black’s Law Dictionary 23 (9th ed.
2009) (defining “accrue” as “[t]o come into existence as an enforce-
able claim or right”).157
The Court added: “[T]he cases in which ‘a statute of limitation may be
suspended by causes not mentioned in the statute itself . . . are very
limited in character, and are to be admitted with great caution; other-
wise the court would make the law instead of administering it.’”158
At a minimum, the CDA forums will need to address, if and when
any litigant raises the question, whether “accrues” in section 7103(a)
(4) (A) means (1) when the claimant “knew or should have known” of
the cause, or (2) in light of Gabelli and other recent precedent, when
the claimant “has a complete and present cause of action” regardless
of the claimant’s state of mind.  In this regard, while the FAR Council
and the CDA forums have relied significantly on Tucker Act prece-
dent, neither appears to have considered that, as in the CDA, the
Tucker Act does not define “accrue,” and since its enactment, the fed-
eral courts consistently have construed “accrue” in the Tucker Act to
mean the date when “when all the events have occurred which fix the
alleged liability of the United States and entitle the claimant to insti-
tute an action.”159
The Supreme Court, moreover, recently clarified that under the
Chevron deference analysis,160 “deference is not due [a regulatory def-
inition of a statutory term] unless a ‘court, employing traditional tools
of statutory construction,’ is left with an unresolved ambiguity. . . .
Where . . . the canons supply an answer, ‘Chevron leaves the
stage.’”161 Notably, there is no indication in the record that the FAR
Council determined that the CDA statute’s use of “accrue” was “am-
biguous,” or adopted its “discovery” definition standard to clarify an
ambiguity. On the contrary, it noted the “discovery requirement must
157. Id. at 448.
158. Id. at 454.
159. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2012) (“Every claim of which the United States
Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred unless the petition thereon is
filed within six years after such claim first accrues”), with 41 U.S.C. § 7103(4)(a)
(2012) (“Each claim by a contractor against the Federal Government relating to a
contract and each claim by the Federal Government against a contractor relating to a
contract shall be submitted within 6 years after the accrual of the claim”); Holmes v.
United States, 657 F.3d 1303, 1317–20 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
160. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S.
837 (1984).
161. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018).
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remain,” notwithstanding little support and much objection among
commentators, because “many pricing defect cases have their original
events at the beginning of the contract or on contract award, but often
cannot be discovered by the Government until years later.” The CDA
forum’s “discovery” rule, and the CDA forum’s default use of that
definition, may be vulnerable in light of Gabelli, a growing hostility to
Chevron deference,162 and the regulatory record.163
162. See Joshua Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference? , TAKE CARE
(June 21, 2018), https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-of-chevron-defer
ence [https://perma.cc/85BY-6LCQ].
163. Notwithstanding Gabelli, at least one court since has found the “meaning of
the word ‘accrue’ is not free of ambiguity.” McDonough v. Anoka Cnty., 799 F.3d
931, 942 (8th Cir. 2015).

